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## HISTORICAL MEMORY AND SYMBOLIC ORIENTATIONS IN THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF KAZAKHSTANI SOCIETY

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**Abstract.** This article examines national identity in contemporary Kazakhstan through the relationship between declarative self-identification, civic belonging, historical memory, and symbolic orientations. Drawing on the concept of the nation as an imagined community, it treats national identity as a multidimensional phenomenon rather than as a simple opposition between ethnic and civic identification. The analysis is based on a nationwide face-to-face survey of the adult population of Kazakhstan conducted in 2023 (N = 4,000). Descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations with Pearson's  $\chi^2$  tests, and binary logistic regression are used.

The findings show that ethnic self-identification remains prevalent at the declarative level, but does not systematically correspond to weaker civic attachment. At the aggregate level, respondents with predominantly ethnic and civic self-identification report almost identical levels of identification as citizens of Kazakhstan and similarly high levels of pride in citizenship. Shared homeland and citizenship are among the most frequently identified foundations of national unity, whereas linguistic and religious markers are less salient and more unevenly distributed across ethnic groups. Historical memory is concentrated around a limited number of shared reference points, particularly independence, while substantial proportions of respondents do not articulate specific positive or negative historical events. The holiday calendar similarly combines broadly shared cultural celebrations with more differentiated religious and less salient state-political dates. Overall, the findings suggest that national identity in Kazakhstan combines a broadly shared civic framework with ethnocultural differentiation and a comparatively thin common historical-symbolic repertoire.

**Keywords:** national identity, historical memory, imagined community, civic identity, ethnic identity, symbolic orientations, Kazakhstan.

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## Introduction

The concept of the nation is central to the analysis of social integration and political loyalty in contemporary societies. In the post-Soviet context, it has gained particular relevance due to the collapse of the Soviet ideological framework and the need to construct new bases of collective identity. States that emerged after 1991 were required to redefine symbolic boundaries and produce integrative national narratives.

Kazakhstan represents a paradigmatic case of this transformation. While a civic model of identity based on equal citizenship is formally declared, public discourse and state policies continue to emphasize the Kazakh language, culture, and historical narrative as the symbolic core of the national project. As a result, national identity is shaped through the coexistence of civic and ethnocultural foundations.

Ongoing social and political changes affecting symbolic orders raise the question of which elements of the national narrative are perceived as meaningful by the population. Analysis of everyday symbolic orientations allows assessment of both the structure of national identity and differences in the incorporation of social and ethnic groups into a shared symbolic space, which is crucial for understanding contemporary challenges to national consolidation.

## Literature review

The study is grounded in B. Anderson's (2001) concept of the nation as an imagined community. Within this perspective, national belonging is understood not as an objective or naturally given condition, but as a symbolic relationship reproduced through shared narratives, classifications, institutions, and representations of collective continuity. A sense of membership in a national community emerges despite the absence of direct interaction among most of its members and depends on their ability to imagine themselves as part of a broader social whole.

This approach is complemented by modernist theories of nationalism, which associate the formation of nations with modernization, institutional development, and cultural standardization (Gellner, 1991). National symbols, public traditions, historical narratives, and commemorative practices can therefore be understood not simply as expressions of an already existing community, but as instruments through which political and social cohesion is produced. Hobsbawm's (2000) concept of invented traditions is particularly relevant in this context, since it draws attention to the institutionalization and repeated performance of symbolic practices that establish a sense of continuity with a selected past.

However, national identity is reproduced not only through explicit ideological narratives and official institutions. Billig's (1995) concept of banal nationalism emphasizes the routine and often unnoticed presence of national categories and symbols in everyday life. Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) subsequently shifted attention from nation-building as an exclusively elite-driven process to the ways in which ordinary people understand, use, and reproduce national categories in everyday contexts. This perspective suggests that declarative self-identification captures only one dimension of national belonging. The category that respondents select when directly asked about their identity does not necessarily determine how they perceive citizenship, national unity, the collective past, public symbols, or the rights and duties associated with membership in the national community.

Brubaker's (2006) understanding of nationhood as a category of practice rather than a fixed social group further supports this distinction. National categories become salient in particular contexts and may be activated differently across cognitive, affective, symbolic, and normative domains. Accordingly, the present study treats national identity as a multidimensional and context-dependent phenomenon. Declarative self-identification is understood as its cognitive dimension, emotional attachment to citizenship and ethnicity as its affective dimension, and perceptions of national unity, historical memory, holidays, rights, and duties as symbolic and normative indicators of everyday national belonging. These indicators do not directly measure observable practices, but they provide survey-based evidence of the symbolic orientations through which respondents interpret membership in the national community.

Historical memory constitutes a central component of this symbolic dimension. It is not treated here as the factual knowledge of history or the simple recollection of past events. Rather, historical memory refers to socially framed and selectively organized representations of the past through which a community establishes continuity between its past, present, and anticipated future. Collective remembering is shaped by present social frameworks and therefore includes both widely shared reference points and omissions, fragmented narratives, and contested

interpretations. The content of collective memory can contribute to national cohesion, but it may also reproduce boundaries and competing understandings of the community (Bachleitner, 2022; Uğur Çınar, 2017).

From this perspective, the analytical significance of historical memory is determined not only by which events respondents mention, but also by the degree to which common symbolic reference points are articulated across social and ethnic groups. A concentrated distribution around a small number of events may indicate the existence of shared symbolic anchors, whereas a high proportion of non-articulated responses may point to the limited institutionalization or personalization of the historical narrative. Positive and negative memories are considered separately because narratives of collective achievement and narratives of trauma may have different structures and integrative effects.

Holidays and commemorative dates represent another mechanism through which the imagined community is periodically reproduced. A holiday calendar connects individual routines with collective time by repeatedly marking events, values, and identities as socially significant. National days can influence collective memory and national identification, while the relative importance attached to different holidays reveals which elements of the official and cultural symbolic repertoire have entered mass consciousness (Ariely, 2019). At the same time, holidays are not inherently integrative: they may reinforce a shared national identity, preserve religious or ethnocultural boundaries, or become arenas in which state-promoted definitions of the nation are accepted, modified, or contested (Hintz and Quatrini, 2021).

The present analysis therefore distinguishes between the formal status of a holiday and its subjective significance for respondents. This makes it possible to assess whether official state dates form the core of the popular symbolic calendar or whether national belonging is reproduced primarily through culturally hybrid, religious, and everyday celebrations. It also allows an evaluation of the degree to which different ethnic groups share a common symbolic calendar and of which types of holidays produce the greatest differentiation between them.

#### ***Kazakhstani Identity as an Analytical Object***

Studies of identity in Kazakhstan generally emphasize its layered and hybrid character, in which ethnic, civic, linguistic, territorial, and cultural components coexist with different degrees of salience. This literature can be divided into two interrelated strands: research on official nation-building discourse and symbolic policy, and empirical studies of mass attitudes and self-identification.

The first strand examines how the state has attempted to combine the promotion of Kazakh language, culture, and historical narratives with the construction of an inclusive civic community. Laruelle (2014) identifies the coexistence of several discursive paradigms, including Kazakhness, Kazakhstanness, and transnational orientations, without their consolidation into a single stable hierarchy. Kadyrzhanov (2012) similarly emphasizes competition and interaction between ethnocultural and civic models of nation-building, as well as the coexistence of primordialist representations and constructivist political practices.

Earlier Kazakhstan-based research also emphasized the coexistence and contextual relationship of different levels of identification. Zabirowa (2003), examining identity formation in the early post-Soviet period, linked the development of civic identification to the transition from an initially ethno-national understanding of statehood toward a political-territorial conception of the nation. She also treated lineage, ethnic, and civic identifications as hierarchically organized and situational rather than as necessarily mutually exclusive alternatives. Shaikemelev (2020), while likewise recognizing the complexity of identity formation in a multiethnic society, places greater emphasis on the consolidating role of Kazakh culture and the state language in the construction of a supraethnic national space. These approaches illustrate a persistent tension in Kazakhstan-focused scholarship between civic-territorial models of integration and approaches that assign a structuring role to the ethnocultural resources of the titular group.

Rees and Burkhanov (2018) examine the relationship between official civic nation-building and ordinary understandings of national belonging through media analysis and ethnographic interviews. They conclude that state policy influences how citizens describe their attachment to Kazakhstan, but has not produced a complete separation of nationality from ethnicity. Ethnonational categories remain significant despite the civic language of official discourse. This finding is important because it demonstrates that state-promoted categories do not automatically determine how national belonging is interpreted at the individual level.

Research on historical policy provides a comparable distinction between official narratives and their social reception. Kundakbayeva and Kassymova (2016), for example, show that the official commemoration of Stalinist

repression in Kazakhstan was constructed through an inclusive discourse that represented repression as a shared tragedy of the different peoples living in the country rather than as an exclusively ethnic Kazakh experience. Their analysis demonstrates how memorial complexes, museum exhibitions, and official speeches can be used to construct a civic framework of collective memory. However, research on state memorial policy does not by itself establish which historical events function as meaningful symbolic reference points in mass consciousness or whether the official historical narrative is equally articulated across different population groups.

The second strand consists of survey-based studies of civic and ethnic identity, linguistic orientations, citizenship, and interethnic differences. Rees and Webb Williams (2017) conceptualize Kazakhstani identity as a supraethnic identity that may be placed above or alongside ethnic identification. Their analysis of survey data shows that language remains a significant barrier to the adoption of a common Kazakhstani identity, while the subjective importance of citizenship is positively associated with identification as Kazakhstani. This study establishes the importance of citizenship and language as predictors of national self-identification, but its main dependent variable remains the degree of identification with a supraethnic category.

Eschment (2020) provides additional empirical evidence for the coexistence of ethnic and civic attachments. Her 2019 survey of Almaty residents found strong ethnic self-identification alongside substantial identification as Kazakhstani, which she interprets in terms of multiple identity. Methodologically, this study is particularly relevant because ethnic and civic identification were measured separately rather than through a forced choice between the two categories. At the same time, its focus on Almaty limits the extent to which these findings can be generalized to the national population.

Sharipova et al. (2017) and Sharipova (2020) similarly examine the determinants and content of civic and ethnic identification in Kazakhstan. These studies demonstrate that civic and ethnic attachments are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that language, ethnicity, religion, and pride have different relationships with national identification. Nevertheless, the dominant analytical framework continues to rely largely on respondents' explicit identity choices and declared attachments. It therefore provides limited evidence on whether declarative ethnic or civic self-identification corresponds to differences in historical memory, symbolic preferences, routine civic belonging, and normative conceptions of citizenship.

Recent studies based on the 2023 national survey have substantially extended this field. Sadvokassova et al. (2025) analyze perceptions of ethnic and civic identity and belonging within Kazakhstan's nation-building project and compare the 2023 findings with an earlier survey conducted in 2016. Their primary focus is the dynamics of identity perceptions and the relationship between state nation-building policies and public attitudes. Sadvokassova et al. (2026), drawing on the same nationwide survey and qualitative interviews, focus specifically on ethnic minorities and the relative salience of civic and ethnic identification. They find that ethnic identification remains important and that the relationship between civic and ethnic identities varies across ethnic groups.

The present study uses the survey component of the same 2023 research project but addresses a different analytical problem. It does not seek primarily to assess public approval of nation-building policies, trace changes between survey waves, or determine whether ethnic minorities prefer an ethnic or civic identity category. Instead, it examines whether a forced choice between ethnic and civic self-identification reflects a broader and internally consistent structure of national belonging. It compares declarative identity with the frequency of identification as a citizen of Kazakhstan, affective attachment to citizenship, perceptions of the foundations of national unity, positive and negative historical memory, evaluations of holidays, and normative understandings of citizens' rights and duties.

Thus, the existing literature leaves three related questions insufficiently addressed. First, it remains unclear whether the conventional ethnic-civic dichotomy describes substantive differences in national belonging or partly reproduces the constraints of survey instruments that require respondents to select one dominant identity. Second, studies of official symbolic policy and studies of mass self-identification have largely developed as separate research strands, leaving limited evidence about which elements of state and historical symbolism are actually shared in mass consciousness. Third, historical memory, holidays, citizenship, and normative expectations are commonly examined as separate subjects rather than as potentially autonomous dimensions of national identity.

This study addresses these gaps by treating declarative self-identification as one component of a multidimensional structure rather than as a comprehensive measure of national identity. Its theoretical contribution is to specify the relationship between cognitive, affective, symbolic, and normative dimensions of belonging. Empirically, it provides a

nationwide comparison of the symbolic reference points shared by different ethnic groups and evaluates the relative integrative significance of civic-territorial, historical, cultural, linguistic, religious, and state-promoted markers. Analytically, it tests whether ethnic and civic identity categories predict everyday symbolic orientations or whether routine civic belonging is reproduced with substantial autonomy from respondents' dominant declarative identity.

### ***Aim and Research Questions***

This study examines the formation and reproduction of the Kazakhstani nation as an imagined community in everyday consciousness, focusing on the relationship between declarative self-identification and other dimensions of national belonging in the post-Soviet context.

Moving beyond approaches centered on declarative self-identification, it analyzes how national belonging is reproduced through routine symbolic orientations, collective rituals, and everyday forms of inclusion. Particular attention is paid to the autonomy of cognitive, affective, symbolic, and normative dimensions of identity, as well as to the relationship between dominant self-identification (ethnic or civic) and everyday forms of civic belonging.

The analysis draws on indicators such as self-identification, affective attachment to citizenship and ethnicity, perceptions of national unity, historical memory, and evaluations of symbolic markers. Special emphasis is placed on holidays as everyday mechanisms of reproducing the imagined community.

The study addresses the following questions:

- To what extent does the ethnic-civic dichotomy reflect identification processes rather than methodological constraints?
- How independent is declarative self-identification from other indicators of civic belonging?
- Which symbolic foundations structure representations of national unity?
- Which elements of the symbolic repertoire have the greatest integrative significance?
- To what extent is national identification expressed through everyday forms of civic belonging and symbolic orientations?

Together, these questions allow the study to move beyond declarative attitudes and examine how national identity is expressed through everyday symbolic orientations, as well as to identify key constraints and resources of national consolidation.

### **Materials and Methods**

***Sampling and data collection.*** The empirical analysis is based on a nationwide face-to-face survey conducted among 4,000 residents of Kazakhstan aged 18 years and older. The survey covered all 17 regions of the country as well as the cities of Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent. The territorial and sex-age structure of the sample was developed using official 2023 population data from the Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan. The final sample included 2,459 urban and 1,541 rural respondents. Women constituted 53.6% of the sample and men 46.4%. Respondents aged 18–29 accounted for 24.1%, those aged 30–45 for 38.8%, those aged 46–60 for 23.9%, and respondents aged 61 and older for 13.3%.

A quota-based route sampling design was used. Within selected localities, interviewers followed predefined routes and approached households at a fixed interval. Interviews were conducted face-to-face. No more than one respondent was interviewed in each household. Within a selected household, respondent recruitment was guided by the remaining sex, age, and ethnicity quotas: an eligible adult was interviewed if his or her characteristics corresponded to a quota category that had not yet been filled.

The sampling design also included deliberate oversampling of ethnic minority groups in order to obtain sufficiently large subsamples for intergroup comparisons. The target sample comprised 1,400 ethnic Kazakhs (35%), 1,000 ethnic Russians (25%), and 160 respondents (4%) from each of ten additional ethnic groups. Kazakh and Russian respondents were distributed across all regions, while respondents belonging to smaller ethnic groups were allocated taking into account their territorial patterns of settlement. Consequently, the ethnic composition of the sample was intentionally disproportionate to the ethnic composition of the national population and was designed to facilitate comparisons across ethnic groups rather than to reproduce their population shares mechanically.

Missing and non-substantive responses were handled according to their analytical meaning. System missing values were excluded from the corresponding analyses, and percentages were calculated on the basis of valid

responses where applicable. “Don’t know” responses were not automatically treated as missing when the absence of an articulated response was itself substantively meaningful. In the analysis of positive historical memory, the “don’t know” response was retained and used to construct the dependent variable for the binary logistic regression, where non-articulation of a specific historical event was contrasted with substantive responses.

**Weighting.** Because ethnic minority groups were deliberately oversampled, population-level descriptive estimates were weighted to reproduce the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan according to the most recent official population data available in 2023. Weighting was not applied to within-group analyses, where comparisons were conducted within the original ethnic subsamples.

**Operationalization of key constructs.** The questionnaire included indicators of declarative self-identification, affective attachment to citizenship and ethnicity, perceptions of national unity, historical memory, symbolic orientations, holidays, and normative views on rights and duties. For analytical purposes, indicators were grouped into three dimensions of identity: a cognitive dimension (declarative self-identification, ethnic or civic); an affective dimension (emotional attachment to citizenship and ethnicity, e.g., pride); and a symbolic-normative dimension (everyday forms of national belonging captured through perceptions of national unity, historical memory, the significance of holidays, and normative expectations regarding citizens’ rights and duties). This grouping allowed the autonomy of different identity levels to be tested empirically rather than reduced to a single self-identification indicator.

**Statistical analysis.** Descriptive statistics were used to examine the distribution of the main indicators. Associations between categorical variables were assessed using Pearson’s  $\chi^2$  test. Statistical significance was evaluated at  $p < .05$ . Cramer’s V was reported as a measure of effect size for statistically tested associations between categorical variables.

For multiple-response questions on holidays, citizens’ rights, and citizens’ duties, each response option was recoded as a separate binary variable (selected = 1, not selected = 0), and its association with ethnicity was assessed using Pearson’s  $\chi^2$  test and Cramer’s V.


A binary logistic regression model was estimated to identify socio-demographic differences in the probability of providing a non-articulated (“don’t know”) response to the question on positive historical memory. The dependent variable was coded 1 for respondents who selected “don’t know” and 0 for respondents who provided another substantive response. Settlement type, age, ethnicity, and education were entered as categorical predictors. Rural residents, respondents aged 60 years and older, ethnic Kazakhs, and respondents with higher education served as reference categories. Model fit was assessed using the omnibus likelihood-ratio test and pseudo- $R^2$  statistics. The model was statistically significant,  $\chi^2(17) = 173.343$ ,  $p < .001$ ; Cox and Snell  $R^2 = .043$  and Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .066$ . Regression results are reported as odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals and p-values.

Statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 27.0.

## Results

### Declarative forms of national identity

**Dominant framework of self-identification: ethnic or civic affiliation.** The distribution of responses to the question of whom respondents most often perceive themselves as shows that 57.9% of valid responses fall into the category “representative of their own ethnicity” (including the category “Kazakh”), while 42.1% of respondents indicated the category “Kazakhstani.” A total of 3,819 valid responses were obtained; the share of system missing values amounted to 4.5% (Figure 1).



**Figure 1. Dominant self-identification of respondents: civic vs. ethnic identity (N = 4,000, %, 2023)**

The association between ethnicity and dominant self-identification was statistically significant and substantial,  $\chi^2(11, N = 3,819) = 461.684, p < .001$ , Cramer's  $V = .348$ . Ethnic self-identification prevailed among Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Dungans, and Chechens, whereas civic self-identification was more common among Russians, Uyghurs, Germans, Tatars, and Koreans. Ukrainians showed a nearly even distribution between the two categories (Table 1).

**Table 1. Dominant self-identification («Kazakhstani» vs. ethnic) by ethnicity**

| Ethnicity    | Kazakhstani identity |      | Ethnic identity |      |
|--------------|----------------------|------|-----------------|------|
|              | N                    | %    | N               | %    |
| Kazakhs      | 322                  | 24.7 | 982             | 75.3 |
| Russians     | 589                  | 60.5 | 384             | 39.5 |
| Uzbeks       | 32                   | 20.1 | 127             | 79.9 |
| Ukrainians   | 75                   | 49.0 | 78              | 51.0 |
| Uyghurs      | 94                   | 59.1 | 65              | 40.9 |
| Germans      | 101                  | 64.7 | 55              | 35.3 |
| Tatars       | 99                   | 63.1 | 58              | 36.9 |
| Azerbaijanis | 71                   | 44.9 | 87              | 55.1 |
| Koreans      | 85                   | 57.0 | 64              | 43.0 |
| Tajiks       | 63                   | 41.2 | 90              | 58.8 |
| Dungans      | 38                   | 25.7 | 110             | 74.3 |
| Chechens     | 37                   | 24.7 | 113             | 75.3 |

This result should be interpreted with caution, as the question imposed a forced choice between civic and ethnic identities. It does not imply rejection of civic identity but rather indicates the relative primacy of ethnic identification.

**Everyday civic identification and its relationship with the dominant type of identity.** The previous point is confirmed by the fact that both “representatives of their own ethnicity” and “Kazakhstanis” report a similar frequency of identification with the group “citizens of Kazakhstan” – 78.1% and 77.8%, respectively.

**Table 2. Frequency of identification with the social group “Citizens of Kazakhstan” by dominant identity type (valid %, excluding missing values)**

| Ethnicity    | Kazakhstani identity |               | Ethnic identity |               | N     | $\chi^2$ | Cramer's V | p-value |
|--------------|----------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-------|----------|------------|---------|
|              | Often                | Rarely/ Never | Often           | Rarely/ Never |       |          |            |         |
| Total sample | 77.8                 | 22.2          | 78.1            | 21.9          | 3,734 | 0.068    | .004       | .794    |
| Kazakhs      | 80.9                 | 19.1          | 84.8            | 15.2          | 1,284 | 2.671    | .046       | .102    |

|              |      |      |      |      |     |        |      |        |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|-----|--------|------|--------|
| Russians     | 77.9 | 22.1 | 71.1 | 28.9 | 947 | 5.636  | .077 | .018   |
| Uzbeks       | 48.4 | 51.6 | 78.7 | 21.3 | 158 | 11.589 | .271 | < .001 |
| Ukrainians   | 86.5 | 13.5 | 71.6 | 28.4 | 148 | 4.937  | .183 | .026   |
| Uyghurs      | 77.2 | 22.8 | 78.5 | 21.5 | 157 | 0.036  | .015 | .849   |
| Germans      | 73.4 | 26.6 | 88.5 | 11.5 | 146 | 4.539  | .176 | .033   |
| Tatars       | 82.8 | 17.2 | 64.3 | 35.7 | 155 | 6.767  | .209 | .009   |
| Azerbaijanis | 80.3 | 19.7 | 79.3 | 20.7 | 158 | 0.023  | .012 | .880   |
| Koreans      | 62.5 | 37.5 | 54.1 | 45.9 | 141 | 1.009  | .085 | .315   |
| Tajiks       | 78.7 | 21.3 | 68.2 | 31.8 | 146 | 1.951  | .116 | .162   |
| Dungans      | 68.4 | 31.6 | 69.7 | 30.3 | 147 | 0.023  | .012 | .881   |
| Chechens     | 91.9 | 8.1  | 78.2 | 21.8 | 147 | 3.471  | .154 | .062   |


The sample size allows two tendencies to be identified clearly and with statistical reliability. First, among Kazakhs (valid N = 1,284), the dominant type of identity (ethnic or civic) is not significantly associated with the frequency of identification with the group “citizens of Kazakhstan.” Second, among Russians (valid N = 947), dominant ethnic self-identification is associated with a somewhat lower frequency of identification with this group.

In the remaining ethnic subgroups (N = 141-158), a number of significant or near-significant differences were identified (in particular, among Uzbeks  $p < .001$ , Tatars  $p = .009$ , Ukrainians  $p = .026$ , Germans  $p = .033$ , Chechens  $p = .062$ ); however, the small size of these subsamples does not allow these patterns to be confidently considered stable and reproducible. They may be treated as preliminary indicators of possible group-specific features requiring confirmation in larger samples.

Affective indicators show the same pattern. Overall, 91.7% of respondents report pride in their citizenship. Among respondents with valid data on both dominant self-identification and pride in citizenship (N = 3,745), the proportion expressing pride was virtually identical among those with predominantly ethnic and civic self-identification (92.2% and 92.4%, respectively). The association was not statistically significant,  $\chi^2(1) = 0.069$ ,  $p = .792$ , Cramer's V = .004. Thus, affective attachment to citizenship shows virtually no association with respondents' dominant declarative self-identification.

### **Key foundations of national unity**

**Civic-territorial and institutional foundations.** In mass perceptions, national unity in Kazakhstan is primarily based on civic-territorial factors. The most common response was a shared homeland and living in one country, which entered the top three for 48.7% of respondents (Figure 2). A comparable level of importance is attributed to the formal-institutional component: citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan was indicated by 46.4% of respondents. Shared historical memory also plays a notable role in the structure of the national narrative (38.9%).



**Figure 2. Responses to the question «What, in your opinion, primarily unites the citizens of the country into a single people of Kazakhstan?», %**

Cultural and linguistic factors play a more limited role. Shared customs and traditions are cited by 28.7% of respondents, and knowledge of the Kazakh language by 26.1%, while knowledge of Russian (12.4%) and religion

(11.9%) are mentioned less frequently. References to external threat or war are minimal (4.1%).

Civic-territorial factors dominate across all groups: a shared homeland is cited by 47.2% of Kazakhs, 48.6% of Russians, and 51.7% of other ethnic groups, and citizenship by 46.4%, 43.8%, and 49.7%, respectively. Intergroup associations for these two factors were very weak (shared homeland:  $\chi^2(2, N = 3,946) = 6.236, p = .044$ , Cramer's  $V = .040$ ; citizenship:  $\chi^2(2, N = 3,946) = 8.902, p = .012$ , Cramer's  $V = .047$ ). Shared historical memory is similarly important (40.2%, 40.8%, and 37.8%) and shows virtually no association with ethnicity,  $\chi^2(2, N = 3,946) = 2.961, p = .227$ , Cramer's  $V = .027$ .

Cultural and linguistic markers show greater variation. Knowledge of the Kazakh language is more salient among Kazakhs (33.3%) than Russians (18.5%), with a stronger association with ethnicity,  $\chi^2(2, N = 3,946) = 66.191, p < .001$ , Cramer's  $V = .130$ . Knowledge of Russian shows the opposite pattern (9.2% vs. 20.3%) and a comparable level of differentiation,  $\chi^2(2, N = 3,946) = 73.274, p < .001$ , Cramer's  $V = .136$ . Other indicators vary more moderately across groups: customs and traditions range from 26.5% to 32.6% ( $\chi^2(2, N = 3,946) = 15.914, p < .001$ , Cramer's  $V = .064$ ), while religion ranges from 7.2% to 16.5% and shows a somewhat stronger intergroup association,  $\chi^2(2, N = 3,946) = 54.401, p < .001$ , Cramer's  $V = .117$ . References to external threat remain marginal in all cases (3.8–4.3%) and do not differ significantly across groups,  $\chi^2(2, N = 3,946) = 0.560, p = .756$ , Cramer's  $V = .012$ .

### ***Positive and negative historical memory***

Positive historical memory in Kazakhstan is characterized by a pronounced concentration around a single dominant symbolic “anchor” – the acquisition of independence (38.6%), while other narratives form a weakly expressed “second tier.” A significant share of respondents does not articulate specific grounds for pride: 21.9% found it difficult to answer, and another 6.2% chose the generalized option “proud of everything,” indicating weak personalization of the positive historical narrative.

Binary logistic regression indicates that the probability of providing a non-articulated response varies significantly across several socio-demographic characteristics (Table 3). Urban respondents were more likely than rural respondents to provide such a response ( $OR = 1.51, p < .001$ ). Age differences were comparatively limited: only respondents aged 30–44 differed significantly from the reference group aged 60 and older ( $OR = 1.30, p = .038$ ).

More substantial variation was associated with ethnicity. Compared with Kazakhs, the odds of a non-articulated response were approximately three times higher among Tajiks ( $OR = 3.00$ ), more than twice as high among Chechens ( $OR = 2.24$ ) and Azerbaijanis ( $OR = 2.16$ ), and moderately higher among Russians ( $OR = 1.29$ ). By contrast, Uyghurs ( $OR = 0.42$ ) and Tatars ( $OR = 0.47$ ) were significantly less likely than Kazakhs to provide a non-articulated response. Differences for Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Germans, Koreans, and Dungans were not statistically significant.

Education was also associated with the articulation of positive historical memory. Compared with respondents with higher education, those with secondary education ( $OR = 1.43, p = .002$ ) and vocational or technical education ( $OR = 1.73, p < .001$ ) were more likely to provide a non-articulated response. Overall, the model was statistically significant,  $\chi^2(17) = 173.343, p < .001$ , although its explanatory power was modest (Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .066$ ), indicating that the observed socio-demographic differences account for only a limited share of variation in the articulation of positive historical memory.

**Table 3. Binary logistic regression predicting a non-articulated response to positive historical memory**


| Predictor              | Category                       | B      | SE    | OR    | 95% CI for OR | p      |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|---------------|--------|
| <b>Ethnicity</b>       | Kazakh (ref.)                  | -      | -     | 1.00  | -             | -      |
|                        | Chechen                        | 0.804  | 0.184 | 2.235 | 1.558–3.207   | < .001 |
|                        | Russian                        | 0.251  | 0.104 | 1.286 | 1.049–1.576   | .016   |
|                        | Uzbek                          | 0.271  | 0.200 | 1.311 | 0.886–1.940   | .176   |
|                        | Ukrainian                      | 0.323  | 0.199 | 1.381 | 0.935–2.041   | .105   |
|                        | Uyghur                         | -0.873 | 0.290 | 0.418 | 0.237–0.738   | .003   |
|                        | German                         | 0.197  | 0.205 | 1.218 | 0.816–1.819   | .334   |
|                        | Tatar                          | -0.756 | 0.269 | 0.470 | 0.277–0.796   | .005   |
|                        | Azerbaijani                    | 0.769  | 0.185 | 2.157 | 1.503–3.097   | < .001 |
|                        | Korean                         | 0.030  | 0.209 | 1.031 | 0.684–1.552   | .885   |
|                        | Tajik                          | 1.098  | 0.178 | 2.998 | 2.115–4.248   | < .001 |
|                        | Dungan                         | -0.118 | 0.231 | 0.889 | 0.565–1.398   | .610   |
| <b>Settlement type</b> | Rural (ref.)                   | -      | -     | 1.00  | -             | -      |
|                        | Urban                          | 0.413  | 0.087 | 1.512 | 1.274–1.794   | < .001 |
| <b>Age</b>             | 60+ (ref.)                     | -      | -     | 1.00  | -             | -      |
|                        | 18-29                          | 0.098  | 0.133 | 1.103 | 0.850–1.430   | .462   |
|                        | 30-44                          | 0.259  | 0.125 | 1.295 | 1.015–1.653   | .038   |
|                        | 45-59                          | -0.053 | 0.134 | 0.949 | 0.730–1.234   | .695   |
| <b>Education</b>       | Higher education (ref.)        | -      | -     | 1.00  | -             | -      |
|                        | Secondary education            | 0.357  | 0.117 | 1.429 | 1.136–1.798   | .002   |
|                        | Vocational/technical education | 0.549  | 0.098 | 1.731 | 1.429–2.098   | < .001 |
| <b>Constant</b>        |                                | -2.171 | 0.155 | 0.114 | -             | < .001 |

Dependent variable: non-articulated (“don’t know”) response to the question on positive historical memory = 1; substantive response = 0. Reference categories: Kazakh ethnicity, rural residence, age 60+, and higher education. Overall effects: ethnicity, Wald  $\chi^2(11) = 94.171$ ,  $p < .001$ ; age, Wald  $\chi^2(3) = 10.243$ ,  $p = .017$ ; education, Wald  $\chi^2(2) = 31.441$ ,  $p < .001$ . Model:  $\chi^2(17) = 173.343$ ,  $p < .001$ ; Cox and Snell  $R^2 = .043$ ; Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .066$

Negative historical memory also demonstrates limited structuring and a contemporary focus: the dominant narrative is the January 2022 events (23.3%), while a substantial proportion of respondents either cannot name such events (23.7%) or deny their existence (22.5%). In addition, a compact set of historical traumas from the Soviet period (the events of 1986, the famine of the 1930s, repressions) is present, along with references to current social problems, although these are much less widespread. Interethnic differences are generally moderate and relate primarily to the degree of articulation rather than the structure of key “anchors,” suggesting the presence of a shared but weakly elaborated negative historical narrative.

#### ***Holidays as a marker of the nation***

The holiday calendar as an element of everyday symbolic space shows that the structure of “significant dates” in mass consciousness is formed around a combination of cultural, religious, and partly civic markers. The most stable core consists of universal and widely shared celebrations – Nauryz and New Year – which function as inclusive symbols not rigidly tied to a single ethnic or confessional group. Religious holidays also play a significant role, although their importance is more segmented. Official state holidays, directly linked to the institutional and political calendar, occupy a peripheral position and are substantially less salient in everyday symbolic orientations (Figure 3).




**Figure 3. Responses to the question “Which holidays do you consider the most significant?” (multiple choice, top 3), %**

The analysis of interethnic differences shows that the degree of differentiation depends on the type of symbolic marker. Religious holidays show the strongest intergroup differentiation: Cramer's  $V$  reaches .521 for Eid al-Fitr, .484 for Christmas, and .482 for Eid al-Adha ( $p < .001$  in all cases). Non-religious dates generally show weaker differentiation, although the association with ethnicity remains noticeable for New Year ( $V = .368$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and Nauryz ( $V = .253$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Differentiation is weaker for most state-political holidays, with Cramer's  $V$  ranging from .060 for Constitution Day to .190 for Victory Day. Even the most universal state holidays do not form a stable shared symbolic core and do not rank among unconditional priorities in any ethnic subgroup. Taken together, this indicates that the common symbolic calendar in Kazakhstan is centered primarily on culturally hybrid and widely shared celebrations, while religious holidays retain stronger ethnocultural differentiation and state-imposed elements of the symbolic order have limited subjective salience.

#### ***Normative dimension of civic identity: rights and duties***

Representations of citizens' duties demonstrate a clear dominance of the institutional-legal framework: the key characteristics of a “good citizen” are compliance with law and public order, paying taxes, work, and participation in elections. Cultural and identity markers – knowledge of the language, respect for symbols and traditions – occupy a peripheral position. The overall hierarchy of normative expectations remains broadly similar across ethnic groups, although individual obligations show varying degrees of intergroup differentiation (Cramer's  $V = .088-.220$ ). The strongest differentiation is observed for preserving nature and natural resources ( $V = .220$ ) and knowing the state language ( $V = .214$ ). Overall, this pattern suggests a broadly shared functional understanding of citizenship rather than complete uniformity across ethnic groups.



**Figure 4. Responses to the question “Which obligations, in your opinion, are most important for a citizen of the country?” (Multiple choice, top 3), %**

A similar pattern is observed in perceptions of rights: basic, socially guaranteed rights – healthcare, security, education, and a fair trial – dominate, while political and civil liberties and rights related to participation and

cultural autonomy are less important. The overall hierarchy of rights remains broadly similar across ethnic groups, although individual rights show varying degrees of intergroup differentiation (Cramer's  $V = .089-.204$ ). The strongest differentiation is observed for participation in the governance of society and the state ( $V = .204$ ), social protection and a decent standard of living ( $V = .201$ ), and the inviolability of property and housing ( $V = .199$ ). This suggests that civic identity is primarily practical, oriented toward stability and social guarantees rather than participation or symbolic expression.

### Discussion

The findings suggest that the conventional distinction between ethnic and civic identity captures only one level of national belonging in Kazakhstan. The forced-choice measure of dominant self-identification produces a clear differentiation between respondents who primarily identify in ethnic terms and those who choose the category "Kazakhstani." However, this differentiation largely disappears when other dimensions of belonging are considered. In the total sample, respondents with predominantly ethnic and civic self-identification report almost identical levels of frequent identification with the group "citizens of Kazakhstan" (78.1% and 77.8%, respectively), and pride in citizenship remains above 92% in both groups. Thus, the choice of an ethnic identity as the dominant self-description should not be interpreted as the absence or weakness of civic attachment. Rather, the results support a multidimensional interpretation of national identity in which ethnic self-categorization, civic belonging, and affective attachment can coexist without forming mutually exclusive alternatives.

This finding develops the argument, present in previous studies of Kazakhstan, that civic and ethnic attachments are not necessarily antagonistic (Sharipova et al., 2017; Sharipova, 2020). It also qualifies approaches in which the relative prevalence of "Kazakh" and "Kazakhstani" identification is treated as a direct indicator of competition between ethnocultural and civic nation-building projects. The present data indicate that respondents may distinguish between identity categories when required to choose a dominant self-description while simultaneously incorporating citizenship into their routine sense of belonging. In this respect, the results are consistent with Brubaker's (2006) understanding of nationhood as a category whose salience varies across contexts and with the emphasis of Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) on the everyday reproduction of national categories. Declarative identity appears to capture which category respondents prioritize when explicitly asked to classify themselves, but it does not exhaust the broader structure of national belonging.

At the same time, the relationship between ethnic and civic identification is not identical across all ethnic groups. Among Kazakhs, the dominant type of self-identification is not significantly associated with the frequency of identifying as a citizen of Kazakhstan. Among Russians, the association is statistically significant, although frequent civic identification remains widespread in both categories. Results for smaller ethnic groups are more heterogeneous, but the limited subgroup sizes make their interpretation less robust. These patterns are broadly compatible with recent findings that the relative salience and relationship of civic and ethnic identities vary across ethnic groups in Kazakhstan (Sadvokassova et al. 2026). Importantly, however, the present results indicate variation in the relationship between different dimensions of identity rather than a simple division into groups characterized by either civic or ethnic belonging. This distinction is analytically important because group differences in dominant self-categorization coexist with a broadly shared civic layer of identification.

The perceived foundations of national unity provide further evidence for this interpretation. Shared homeland, citizenship, and common historical experience are substantially more salient as unifying factors than religion or either of the two major languages. Moreover, the importance attached to territory and citizenship varies relatively little between Kazakhs, Russians, and respondents from other ethnic groups, whereas linguistic and religious markers show greater differentiation. This suggests that the most widely shared components of national belonging are those that do not require cultural homogenization. The result does not imply that language or ethnocultural affiliation are irrelevant to national identity. Previous research has demonstrated the importance of language for self-identification and the adoption of Kazakhstani identity (Rees and Webb Williams, 2017). The present findings instead indicate that the factors associated with individual identity choice are not necessarily identical to the factors respondents perceive as integrating the national community as a whole. Language may remain important for identity differentiation while citizenship and territorial belonging provide a broader common denominator.

Historical memory displays a different structure. Independence constitutes the clearest positive symbolic anchor, but it is not accompanied by an equally dense repertoire of widely articulated historical reference points. More than one fifth of respondents could not identify a specific positive historical event, while negative historical memory is similarly characterized by a high proportion of non-articulated responses and by the prominence of the January 2022 events. The coexistence of several recognizable common reference points with substantial non-articulation suggests that shared historical memory is present but only partially consolidated into a detailed national narrative. This distinction is relevant to studies of memory politics in Kazakhstan. Kundakbayeva and Kassymova (2016), for example, demonstrate how official commemorative practices can frame historical trauma as a shared civic experience. The present findings complement this perspective by showing that the existence of an institutionalized commemorative framework does not necessarily imply equally strong articulation of the corresponding narrative in mass consciousness.

The regression analysis further shows that this weak articulation of positive historical memory is socially uneven. The probability of providing no specific historical reference is higher among urban respondents and among respondents with secondary or vocational education than among those with higher education, while substantial differences also appear between ethnic groups. At the same time, the explanatory power of the model remains limited, indicating that these socio-demographic characteristics account for only a relatively small part of the variation. The results therefore do not support a simple division between groups included in and excluded from a national historical narrative. Rather, they point to uneven access to, familiarity with, or relevance of particular historical representations. In theoretical terms, this is consistent with approaches that treat collective memory as selective and socially framed rather than as a uniformly shared body of historical knowledge (Bachleitner, 2022; Uğur Çınar, 2017). What appears to be shared most consistently is a limited set of symbolic anchors, while the broader historical repertoire remains considerably more fragmented.

The holiday calendar reveals a similar distinction between formally institutionalized symbols and symbols embedded in everyday life. Nauryz and New Year occupy the most prominent positions across the sample, whereas explicitly state-political holidays are less salient. Religious holidays are important but also produce stronger inter-group differentiation. This pattern corresponds to the broader observation that commemorative dates may either integrate communities or reproduce social and cultural boundaries (Ariely, 2019; Hintz and Quatrini, 2021). In the Kazakhstani case, the most integrative holidays are not necessarily those with the clearest formal connection to the state. Instead, the common symbolic calendar is centered on practices that can be incorporated into different ethnic, linguistic, and religious contexts. The findings therefore lend empirical support to the perspective of banal and everyday nationalism: national belonging may be reproduced through recurrent and familiar practices without requiring strong ideological content or explicit political mobilization.

This distinction is also visible in respondents' normative understanding of citizenship. Duties associated with law, public order, taxation, employment, and electoral participation are prioritized over explicitly cultural obligations, while socially guaranteed rights such as healthcare, security, education, and a fair trial are more salient than rights related to political participation or cultural autonomy. Together with the high level of affective attachment to citizenship, this pattern suggests a predominantly functional understanding of civic membership. Citizenship is meaningful primarily as membership in a shared territorial, legal, and institutional order rather than as adherence to a uniform cultural model. The limited variation in these expectations across ethnic groups is particularly important because it indicates that common normative conceptions of citizenship extend beyond differences in dominant self-identification.

Taken together, the findings suggest that national identity in Kazakhstan is structured asymmetrically across its different dimensions. Civic belonging is comparatively strong at the affective, territorial, institutional, and normative levels, whereas the explicitly symbolic-historical repertoire is less densely articulated. This helps explain the apparent contradiction between the persistence of strong ethnic self-identification and the simultaneously high level of civic attachment. The two are not necessarily competing answers to the same question: they operate at partly different levels of identification. In this sense, the Kazakhstani case can be described as a form of national belonging in which a broadly shared civic framework coexists with substantial ethnocultural differentiation and a relatively thin common symbolic repertoire.

This interpretation also has implications for nation-building policy. The results suggest that the most broadly shared foundations of belonging are territory, citizenship, routine civic attachment, and culturally non-exclusive practices. By contrast, language, religion, and formally prescribed state symbols generate either greater differentiation or lower levels of subjective salience. This does not establish that particular symbolic policies are effective or ineffective, since the cross-sectional survey design cannot identify causal effects. It does, however, indicate that national consolidation cannot be inferred simply from the formal presence of state narratives or symbols. Their integrative significance depends on the extent to which they become meaningful within everyday understandings and practices across different groups. From this perspective, the principal contribution of the study is to demonstrate empirically that declarative self-identification, affective civic attachment, historical memory, symbolic preferences, and normative citizenship constitute related but partially autonomous dimensions of national identity.

### **Conclusion**

The findings demonstrate that national identity in contemporary Kazakhstan cannot be adequately described as a simple choice between ethnic and civic identification. Although ethnic self-identification remains prevalent at the declarative level, it does not systematically correspond to weaker civic belonging. Respondents who prioritize ethnic and civic categories show very similar levels of identification with the group “citizens of Kazakhstan” and similarly high levels of pride in citizenship. This suggests that declarative self-identification represents only one dimension of national belonging and that ethnic and civic attachments can coexist within the same identity structure.

The results also reveal an asymmetry between different components of this structure. Civic-territorial and institutional foundations, particularly shared homeland and citizenship, are broadly recognized across ethnic groups, while linguistic, religious, and explicitly cultural markers are more differentiated. At the same time, the common historical and symbolic repertoire is comparatively weakly articulated. Independence functions as the clearest positive historical reference point, but substantial proportions of respondents are unable to identify specific positive or negative historical events. A similar pattern is visible in the holiday calendar: culturally inclusive and routinized celebrations are more salient than most formally established state holidays. Taken together, these findings indicate that shared civic belonging is more consistently expressed than a dense and uniformly articulated historical-symbolic narrative.

The theoretical contribution of the study lies in treating national identity as a multidimensional structure rather than reducing it to respondents’ dominant self-identification. The analysis shows that cognitive self-categorization, affective attachment to citizenship, historical memory, symbolic preferences, and normative understandings of civic membership are related but partially autonomous dimensions. Empirically, the study demonstrates that differences between ethnic groups concern not only the prevalence of particular identity categories but also the ways in which ethnic, civic, historical, and symbolic components of belonging are combined.

The findings also have practical implications for nation-building and symbolic policy. The relatively broad salience of territorial belonging, citizenship, legal and social expectations, and culturally non-exclusive everyday practices suggests that these elements may provide a wider basis for national integration than symbols whose meaning is strongly associated with particular linguistic, religious, or ethnocultural groups. At the same time, the limited salience of several official holidays and the uneven articulation of historical memory indicate that the formal institutionalization of symbols does not necessarily translate into their equal significance in everyday consciousness. Policy efforts aimed at strengthening shared national belonging should therefore take into account not only the formal status of symbols and narratives but also their actual resonance across different social groups.

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting these findings. First, the cross-sectional design does not allow conclusions about changes over time or causal relationships between different dimensions of identity. Second, the analysis relies on self-reported attitudes and evaluations, which may be influenced by social desirability and by the wording and structure of survey questions. In particular, the forced-choice measure of dominant ethnic or civic identification simplifies potentially overlapping and situational forms of belonging. Third, several indicators capture symbolic orientations rather than observable everyday practices and therefore should not be interpreted as direct measures of behavior. Finally, the relatively small size of some ethnic subsamples limits the robustness of group-specific comparisons. Future research could address these limitations through longitudinal designs, alterna-

tive measures allowing multiple simultaneous identities, qualitative analysis of the meanings attached to national symbols, and closer examination of how national belonging is reproduced in everyday practices.

### Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

### Authors' Contributions

**G.Ye. Okassova** – conceptualization, methodology, investigation, project administration, writing – review and editing.

**M.S. Kaldybayev** – conceptualization, data curation, formal analysis, writing – original draft.

**I. Kunina** – conceptualization, methodology, supervision, writing – review and editing.

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#### ҰЛТТЫҚ БІРЕГЕЙЛІКТІҢ ҚҰРЫЛЫМЫНДАҒЫ ТАРИХИ ЖАД ЖӘНЕ СИМВОЛДЫҚ БАҒДАРЛАР: ҚАЗАҚСТАНДЫҚ ҚОҒАМДЫ ЭМПИРИЯЛЫҚ ТАЛДАУ

**Аңдатпа.** Мақалада қазіргі Қазақстандағы ұлттық бірегейлік декларативті өзін-өзі сәйкестендіру, азаматтық тиесілілік, тарихи жады және символдық бағдарлар арасындағы өзара байланыс тұрғысынан қарастырылады. Ұлтты қиялданған қауымдастық ретінде түсіндіретін тұжырымдамаға сүйене отырып, зерттеу ұлттық бірегейлікті этникалық және азаматтық сәйкестендірудің қарапайым қарама-қарсылығы ретінде емес, көпөлшемді құбылыс ретінде қарастырады. Талдау 2023 жылы жүргізілген Қазақстанның ересек халқының жалпыұлттық бетпе-бет сауалнамасының деректеріне негізделген (N = 4 000). Сипаттама-лық статистика, Пирсонның  $\chi^2$  критерийі қолданылған айқаспалы кестелер және бинарлық логистикалық регрессия пайдаланылды.

Нәтижелер декларативті деңгейде этникалық өзін-өзі сәйкестендірудің басым болып қала беретінін, алайда оның азаматтық байланыстылықтың әлсіздігімен жүйелі түрде ұштаспайтынын көрсетеді. Жалпы іріктеме деңгейінде этникалық немесе азаматтық өзін-өзі сәйкестендіруі басым респонденттер Қазақстан азаматтары тобымен сәйкестенудің іс жүзінде бірдей деңгейін және азаматтығын мақтан тұтудың ұқсас жоғары деңгейін көрсетеді. Ортақ Отан мен азаматтық ұлттық бірліктің ең жиі аталатын негіздерінің қатарына жатады, ал тілдік және діни маркерлердің маңыздылығы төменірек және олар этникалық топтар арасында біркелкі бөлінбеген. Тарихи жады ортақ символдық тірек нүктелерінің шектеулі жиынтығына, ең алдымен тәуелсіздікке шоғырланған, сонымен бірге респонденттердің елеулі бөлігі нақты жағымды немесе жағымсыз тарихи оқиғаларды атай алмайды. Мерекелер күнтізбесі де кеңінен ортақтасатын мәдени мерекелерді этникалық топтар арасында көбірек сараланатын діни және маңыздылығы төменірек мемлекеттік-саяси даталармен ұштастырады. Жалпы алғанда, нәтижелер Қазақстандағы ұлттық бірегейліктің көпшілікке ортақ азаматтық негізді этномәдени дифференциациямен және салыстырмалы түрде жұтаң ортақ тарихи-символдық репертуармен ұштастыратынын көрсетеді.

**Негізгі ұғымдар:** ұлттық бірегейлік, тарихи жады, қиялданған қауымдастық, азаматтық бірегейлік, этникалық бірегейлік, символдық бағдарлар, Қазақстан.

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## ИСТОРИЧЕСКАЯ ПАМЯТЬ И СИМВОЛИЧЕСКИЕ ОРИЕНТАЦИИ В СТРУКТУРЕ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ: ЭМПИРИЧЕСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ КАЗАХСТАНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА

**Аннотация.** В статье рассматривается национальная идентичность в современном Казахстане через взаимосвязь декларативного самоотнесения, гражданской принадлежности, исторической памяти и символических ориентаций. Опираясь на концепцию нации как воображаемого сообщества, исследование рассматривает национальную идентичность как многомерный феномен, а не как простое противопоставление этнической и гражданской идентификации. Анализ основан на данных общенационального очного опроса взрослого населения Казахстана, проведенного в 2023 году (N = 4 000). Используются описательная статистика, таблицы сопряженности с критериями  $\chi^2$  Пирсона и бинарная логистическая регрессия.

Результаты показывают, что этническое самоотнесение сохраняет преобладание на декларативном уровне, однако оно не связано систематически с более слабой гражданской привязанностью. На уровне всей выборки респонденты с преимущественно этническим и гражданским самоотнесением демонстрируют практически одинаковый уровень идентификации с гражданами Казахстана и сходно высокий уровень гордости своим гражданством. Общая Родина и гражданство входят в число наиболее часто называемых оснований национального единства, тогда как языковые и религиозные маркеры менее значимы и более неравномерно распределены между этническими группами. Историческая память концентрируется вокруг ограниченного числа общих точек отсчета, прежде всего независимости, при этом значительная доля респондентов не артикулирует конкретные позитивные или негативные исторические события. Календарь праздников сходным образом сочетает широко разделяемые культурные праздники с более дифференцированными религиозными и менее значимыми государственно-политическими датами. В целом результаты позволяют предположить, что национальная идентичность в Казахстане сочетает широко разделяемую гражданскую основу с этнокультурной дифференциацией и сравнительно разреженным общим историко-символическим репертуаром.

Ключевые слова: национальная идентичность, историческая память, воображаемое сообщество, гражданская идентичность, этническая идентичность, символические ориентиры, Казахстан.

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