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The peculiarities of the impact of disinformation on modern kazakh society

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Abstract. In today's world, the flow of information is becoming increasingly intense, making the issue of misinformation dissemination particularly pressing. Fake news, manipulative narratives, and propaganda have a significant impact on public opinion, especially in the digital environment. Consequently, critical thinking and media literacy have become among the most essential competencies for every citizen.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the level of media literacy among Kazakhstan's population, identify key factors influencing information perception, and determine the groups most vulnerable to misinformation. The paper explores the mechanisms of misinformation dissemination, its impact on different segments of society, and possible strategies for counteracting it.

The research methodology includes both quantitative and qualitative analyses. A nationwide survey of 1,000 respondents, along with expert interviews with media, communication, and education specialists, was conducted. The findings indicate that a significant portion of the population lacks a critical approach to assessing information from various sources, including social media. Young people and rural residents with limited educational and analytical resources are particularly susceptible to misinformation.

The study highlights the necessity of a comprehensive approach to media literacy development, which should encompass educational initiatives, increased transparency in information dissemination, and improvements in the quality of national media.

The practical significance of this study lies in the development of targeted measures aimed at fostering a critical attitude toward information, increasing trust in reliable sources, and creating a resilient media environment capable of withstanding manipulative information influences.

Keywords: media literacy, misinformation, critical thinking, fact-checking, information security, social media, Kazakhstan

Introduction

The realities of today include a complex online information environment that has only conditional boundaries and, for the most part, constitutes a unified global information space where fake news, disinformation, and propaganda are actively disseminated. Tensions are increasing both internally – within countries – where media outlets provoke divisions, and internationally – between nations (*Russkaya sluzhba "Golosa Ameriki", 2022*).

It is important to note a key distinction: unlike propaganda, disinformation does not aim to "instill" something or create belief in a particular narrative. On the contrary, its goal is often to disrupt a person's frame of reference, pushing them into a state of cognitive dissonance, where they transition into a mindset of distrust towards everything, ultimately believing that there is no such thing as truth (*Tiahnyriadno, L. (2022) and Pocheptsov, G. (2018)*).

Cybersecurity and information technologies are increasingly served as new tools for achieving objectives, both by global and local actors, while the media space has become an arena for the struggle for dominance. Therefore, in today's reality, the presence of a national information ecosystem and the education of citizens in critical thinking are of paramount importance.

In modern Kazakh society, the issue of propaganda and disinformation is often discussed in the context of the prevalence of Russian propaganda, particularly through television, which undermines Kazakhstan's information security (*Airan, 2023*). It is emphasized that Russian television, being more industrialized, far surpasses Kazakhstan's television industry due to its resources, higher-quality content, and superior visual presentation. Furthermore, Russian-language content is readily accessible to virtually the entire population of Kazakhstan.

Despite the rapid development of the internet segment, it is worth noting that television remains the most trusted source of information in Kazakhstan. The preference for television is also influenced by several other factors, including long-established habits of consuming information and economic considerations – television is a free source of information, unlike the internet, which requires payment. Additionally, television serves as one of the most accessible entertainment resources for the majority of the population living in rural regions and villages.

In addition to Russian propaganda and disinformation, attention must also be given to domestic state propaganda, which accompanies all government programs, elections, and the activities of senior officials. The government occasionally conducts test "insider" leaks on political topics to gauge public opinion. However, it generally exhibits a lack of transparency in providing timely clarifications and openly sharing information, creating a favorable environment for rumors and fake news.

The general informational noise, including the growing influence of social media and bloggers on audiences, both local and foreign – must also be considered. According to research, the majority of Kazakhstan's citizens are inclined not to fact-check the information they receive.

In this context, the authors of the study hypothesized that Kazakhstan's citizens are highly susceptible to the influence of disinformation, with youth and residents of territories bordering Russia being at the greatest risk.

This article aims to address several research questions, including: What is the impact of disinformation on modern Kazakh society? How does it affect various categories of the

population? What are the most effective methods of its dissemination? What are the optimal ways to enhance information literacy among citizens in Kazakhstan?

The methodological foundation of this article is the sociological study "The Impact of Disinformation on Kazakh Society," conducted by the Youth Information Service of Kazakhstan (YISK) in 2022 (Baigutanova et al., 2021).

The study employed both quantitative (population survey) and qualitative (expert interviews) methods of data collection. The mass survey involved 1,000 respondents aged 14 and older from 16 regional centers and 32 villages across Kazakhstan, conducted in Kazakh and Russian. The sample included 47% men and 53% women, with 66% residing in urban areas and 34% in rural areas. Expert interviews were conducted with six specialists in each of the following professional categories: journalists, media specialists, educators, and civil servants. The research was carried out between July and August 2022.

The novelty of this work lies in its analysis of narratives within Kazakhstan's information space related to the spread of disinformation. New results include an examination of how information from media and social networks is perceived in Kazakhstan, based on the sociological study. In particular, the research revealed that citizens of Kazakhstan tend to exhibit an uncritical approach to the information they consume. Another significant finding highlighted in the study is the argument regarding the specific influence of social media on the country's youth, given their low level of awareness about the threats present in the information space.

Literature review

Issues related to disinformation in the scientific literature of Kazakhstan largely began to emerge during the coronavirus pandemic, starting in 2020. In particular, the majority of articles on disinformation in Kazakhstan focus on how COVID-19-related fake news affected the behavioral strategies of citizens. This topic has been explored by Baigutanova et al. (2021), Abubakrieva, A.A., et al. (2020), Negai et al. (2020), and Aitysheva & Kabzhaparova (2023).

Researchers have noted that disinformation, often fueled by rumors, stigma, and conspiracy theories, can have a significant negative impact on both individuals and society as a whole, especially if it is trusted more than fact-based recommendations. In this context, healthcare-related information, particularly disinformation surrounding COVID-19, requires special attention and proactive suppression. As a recommendation, researchers have suggested involving local communities and relevant government agencies in identifying and debunking such disinformation.

The second most prevalent theme related to disinformation in Kazakhstan is the study of its manifestations within the country's information space. This suggests that Kazakhstan is still in the process of conceptualizing the phenomenon of disinformation, its nature, and its manifestations. Among these are publications by Ashenova, S.V. (2022), who emphasizes the necessity of fact-checking websites as new elements of the media landscape in the context of changes in the online information space; Aubakirova & Algalieva (2021), who examine the impact of fact-checking on public consciousness; Nurtazina, M. (2021), who explores the phenomenon

of media fakes and methods for analyzing them; and Sultangaliyeva, G., et al. (2024), who analyze the spread of disinformation and inaccurate information on various social platforms.

The third group consists of articles that can be conditionally labeled as "precautionary." These articles also aim to conceptualize the nature of disinformation. However, the authors of these works go further by proposing strategies for how the state and/or society should respond to the challenges posed by the spread of disinformation. One group of authors advocates for strengthening the country's information security, as seen in the works of Arenova et al. (2017), Saurbayev (2018), and Aksakalova (2020), who also emphasizes that state information security should not be confused with the information security of the elite. Meanwhile, another group argues for enhancing public information literacy and promoting media literacy, as suggested by Alimbaeva, Smatova, & Mazhibaev (2020), and Chernova et al., (2021).

The research on disinformation in Kazakhstan, such as the study "Media Consumption and Disinformation in Central Asia: Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment in the Geopolitical Context" conducted by Internews Europe (2023), is of particular interest in the context of this work. One of the key findings of this study is that the strong presence of Kremlin-sponsored media in Kazakhstan significantly influences a large portion of the population. Specifically, the research revealed the following: less-educated respondents in Central Asia are more likely to rely on national television channels as their primary source of domestic news compared to more educated respondents. Additionally, older and rural citizens are more inclined to prefer television as a source of news information.

Regarding the discussion in media and socio-political platforms, the following narratives are present:

1. Lack of independent tools to counter disinformation and propaganda. Citizens of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries are left defenseless against the unprecedented amount of false information, half-truths, manipulations, and fake news from both local and foreign sources, including pro-war propaganda. Even experienced journalists trained in fact-checking tools find it challenging to immediately distinguish between facts and manipulations. This issue is highlighted by regional analysts and public figures who participated in academic events organized by the Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting (*Abisheva, S. (2022) and Cabar.Asia (2022)*).

2. The domestic information Space is Characterized by a Large Number of External Information Intrusions. These intrusions are driven by factors such as hybrid wars between states and the lack or concealment of official information on certain topics within the country. This point is specifically noted by analysts from the research center A+Analytics.

3. Part of Kazakhstan's Society Falls Victim to Russian Propaganda. This is due to the strong presence of Russian media in Kazakhstan, especially informational and news television channels, which consistently display signs of propaganda and militarism. This category of citizens is highly categorical and unwilling to consider alternative perspectives. Researchers describe this phenomenon as the "deliberative distortion effect," where individuals believe that discussing politics with others is pointless, and the "third-person effect," where people are convinced that others, but not themselves, are influenced by the media. These positions lead to a complete absence of argument exchange. This phenomenon is explored by analysts such as D. Satpayev

(Satpayev, 2022) and Sh. Nurseitov, S. Beysembayev, D. Alzhanov in a publication edited by Yu. Korosteleva (Korosteleva, 2022).

Thus, a review of the literature demonstrates that the phenomenon of disinformation has only recently begun to be studied in Kazakhstan. Initially, its exploration was significantly influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the related disinformation, which had a serious negative impact on society. As a result, a substantial portion of scientific literature in Kazakhstan related to disinformation primarily focuses on understanding its nature, characteristics, and manifestations. There are very few academic or even journalistic works specifically dedicated to the impact of disinformation on Kazakh society. Most of these are isolated reports based on the findings of sociological research.

However, there is an increasing need to examine the impact of disinformation in greater detail, particularly in the context of socio-demographic groups. It is widely recognized that different categories of the population tend to prefer different media sources. From this perspective, it is important not only to assess the level of trust citizens place in mass media but also to understand their level of information literacy, their approach to consuming information critically, and whether they practice fact-checking in their daily lives.

The concept of “information literacy”, as defined here, encompasses the critical analysis of information and the competent use of media. This is discussed in the works of Jeong, S., Cho, H., & Hwang, Y. (2012), Rockman, I.F. (2004), and Wilson & Duncan (2009). These authors specifically note that in the increasingly complex information environment, individuals are exposed to an overwhelming volume of not only necessary but also unreliable and misleading information. At the same time, modern mass media employs increasingly sophisticated methods to compete for readers' attention.

Research results

Based on the research conducted, the key conclusion is that Kazakh society is currently significantly vulnerable to the threats of disinformation and propaganda. This is primarily due to the general lack of critical perception of information disseminated in the media and the absence of experience in fact-checking or verifying information among most of the population. Moreover, about 20% of the population is unfamiliar with the concept and, consequently, the nature of propaganda.

The study also shows that those most at risk of falling victim to fake news or any type of propaganda are primarily youth aged 14 to 18 and individuals with lower educational levels. These findings are supported by other similar studies conducted in Kazakhstan, such as the research by Internews Europe (2023).

Then it comes to political information about Kazakhstan, citizens primarily rely on domestic central and regional media (79% and 36%, respectively). At the same time, one in six citizens, or 18%, turns to Russian media for information about the political situation in their own country.

Nearly half of the population distrusts both domestic and foreign media regarding internal political matters, highlighting the existing problems with public trust. This trust forms the social fabric and is essentially the foundation for social stability. External disinformation has likely

contributed significantly to this issue, as its goal is often to disrupt an individual's framework of understanding, leading them to adopt a generalized distrust of everyone and the belief that there is no such thing as truth (*Tyagniyadno, 2022*).

However, it is worth noting the argument that if a society fosters social inclusion – where every citizen, regardless of their characteristics, feels that they have a voice and are valued – disinformation and propaganda become less effective.

According to Kazakh citizens, false information and propaganda have primarily addressed topics such as the war (or "special military operation") in Ukraine, vaccination related to the coronavirus pandemic, and the January events in Kazakhstan.

Participants in the study most frequently identified risks of propaganda in Kazakh and Russian mass media (44% and 41%, respectively), with significantly fewer seeing such risks in American and Chinese information sources (12% and 13%). However, regarding disinformation and manipulation of information, Kazakh citizens perceive Chinese media as the main culprit (46%). In this context, these perceptions are more about citizens' beliefs and assumptions rather than actual verified instances of propaganda or disinformation.

The top three countries whose media sources, according to respondents, are also perceived as heavily laden with disinformation include the United States (39%) and Ukraine (38%).

Regional differences in information perception are noteworthy. The survey revealed that nearly one-third of Kazakh citizens in the northern and central regions of the country rely on Russian media and their interpretations of events in Kazakhstan and the world. In contrast, the population of the capital tends to diversify its information sources to form its perspective on current events.

At present, there are no exact official statistics on what proportion of Kazakhstan's audience primarily watches Russian television. However, the research shows that nearly one in five Kazakh citizens trust information about the country's internal politics provided by Russian media, and one in three relies on Russian media when exploring issues related to Kazakhstan's foreign policy.

This means that at least one-fifth of the country's population views the situation in their country through the "lens" of Russian mass media, which are increasingly characterized by "conflict-driven" discourses regarding Kazakhstan. These figures are corroborated by other studies on the same topic. For instance, according to the Demoscope Express Public Opinion Monitoring Bureau (2022), nearly a quarter (23%) of surveyed Kazakh citizens consume Russian news.

At the same time, it is evident that significant disparities exist within Kazakh society regarding perceptions of Russia and the information provided by Russian media. Roughly equal proportions of citizens believe that Russian media are more likely than others to engage in disinformation and manipulation (42%) and those who oppose this viewpoint (36%).

In essence, Russian propaganda achieves its goal by dividing society into "us" and "them," based on acceptance or rejection of its imposed narratives. This is particularly concerning given that Kazakh citizens are generally inclined not to verify the information they receive – only 19% of Kazakhs, or one in five, consistently fact-check information obtained through mass media and social networks.

In terms of age, young people, unlike the older generation, tend to consult a broader range of sources, including media from different countries. This may be attributed to, firstly, a greater prevalence of foreign language skills among younger individuals and, secondly, more advanced internet usage skills. However, this behavior is limited to a relatively small group of youth, which does not yet indicate a broader trend.

In the context of education, the tendency to diversify information sources is more characteristic of Kazakh citizens with higher education, according to the study's findings.

The research confirmed the hypothesis that Kazakh citizens who rely on a single source of information are more susceptible to disinformation than those who consume information from multiple sources. For instance, among those least likely to believe the narratives promoted by Russian media about the activities of the Central Reference Laboratory (referred to in some media as the "biological laboratory"), there are more residents of Astana and, in terms of education, more highly educated citizens. Both groups tend to use multiple information sources. Conversely, among the older generation, who are less inclined to diversify their sources of information, more individuals view the establishment of the laboratory in Almaty negatively, likely influenced by the narratives presented by Russian media regarding its activities.

The primary challenge posed by the significant engagement of the Kazakh audience with Russian propaganda and disinformation is the growing polarization within Kazakh society. To address this, several measures are recommended:

1. Promoting and Teaching Media Literacy: efforts should focus on educating citizens, with particular emphasis on the older generation and youth aged 14 to 18. These groups are identified as the most vulnerable to the effects of disinformation.

2. Enhancing the Competitiveness of Kazakh Media: It is crucial to improve the capacity of Kazakh media to provide comprehensive and accurate coverage of key issues in all spheres of society. This would help reduce the reliance on foreign media sources.

3. Ensuring Trust in Domestic Media: for Kazakh media to gain public trust, government institutions must ensure the accessibility and timeliness of information on critical issues. Transparent and responsive communication from state entities is essential.

These measures are not unique and have been widely implemented in developed countries that have long recognized the significant threats posed by disinformation in the modern world.

Disinformation and the Role of Social Media for Youth in Kazakhstan

As noted earlier, the study found that youth are among the most at-risk groups, primarily due to their limited awareness of concepts such as propaganda and their lower likelihood of recognizing the possibility of information distortion by mass media. These tendencies were particularly evident among young people under the age of 18. Focusing on other aspects of how Kazakhstani youth perceive information, the study identified the following characteristics, particularly concerning the significance of social media for young people in Kazakhstan:

1. Trust in Bloggers and Influencers. Compared to other age groups, youth are more likely to trust various bloggers and influencers. While only 8.3% of young people considered the opinions of bloggers, vloggers, and TikTok users authoritative, more than half actively used the information provided by them.

2. Shift Away from Television. Kazakhstani youth have largely moved away from television. Their main sources of political information are social media, blogs, and messaging apps (60.3%). Most of the youth rely on platforms such as WhatsApp, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok. Fewer than half use Telegram, VKontakte, and Facebook.

3. Higher Trust in Internet Resources Among Rural Youth. The proportion of rural youth who fully trust information from Internet resources is twice as high as among urban youth leisure.

4. Social Media as Primary Leisure Activity. For the majority of Kazakhstani youth, spending time on social media (74.3%) is the main form of leisure (*The Impact of disinformation on the society of Kazakhstan, 2022*).

5. Participation Through Content Creation. Youth actively participate by creating content on social media. In light of the perception among young Kazakhs that their opportunities for political engagement are currently limited, their potential for civic participation has shifted to social media (*Bekbasova, 2022*). This suggests that social media serves not only as a platform for leisure and education but also as a space for civic self-expression and engagement.

The facts outlined above demonstrate that Kazakhstani youth must be a primary focus when developing strategies for improving information literacy, especially among rural youth. This is particularly critical in the context of disinformation and their growing reliance on social media for information and participation.

Conclusion

Among the main reasons why Kazakhstani citizens are vulnerable to disinformation, experts who participated in the study highlighted the infantile attitude of the audience toward consuming information. This includes an unwillingness to seek the truth independently, to examine situations from multiple perspectives, and to make informed decisions—essentially, an aversion to taking responsibility for their own lives. As a result, the audience looks to television for clarity and "ready-made solutions" to improve their lives. This tendency explains the effectiveness of propaganda. Experts describe this audience approach as operating in a "religious mode" ("I believe this, and it makes me feel better"), contrasting it with a scientific worldview.

The Importance of Information Literacy

Developing information literacy is therefore critical for Kazakhstan. As mentioned earlier, the phenomenon of disinformation only became a subject of widespread discussion in the country after the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. In contrast, in the United States, Paul Zurkowski argued as early as 1974 for the adoption of a national educational program to ensure universal information literacy by 1984. Zurkowski emphasized that access to and dissemination of information are factors of economic advantage.

Globally, several frameworks have been developed to define media literacy as a discipline. Initially, 18 concepts of media literacy were proposed, later streamlined into five key concepts. The Center for Media Literacy (USA) has since created a comprehensive model known as Questions/TIPS, which broadly emphasizes the skills of critical thinking, comprehension, and

interpretation of information. This framework underscores that media and information literacy is an essential prerequisite for societal development in an increasingly complex information environment.

The Concept of an "Information-Rich Individual"

Researchers have introduced the term "information-rich individual", referring to someone capable of effectively utilizing diverse types of information and committed to lifelong learning and self-improvement. Bridging the gap between the skills and knowledge acquired in school and those required in contemporary society and the workplace is identified as one of the most critical skills of the 21st century.

To address this need, the "Partnership for 21st Century Skills" program was developed in the United States. Established in 2001 with the support of the U.S. government and leading private-sector organizations (e.g., Apple, Cisco Systems, Dell, Microsoft, and the National Education Association), the program centers on 21st-century skills in education. It is based on the idea that expanding the pool of "information-rich individuals" – people who are deliberately and thoughtfully engaged and capable of sustaining lifelong media literacy education – requires strategic integration of media literacy training into classroom curricula (*Partnership for 21st Century Skills, 2003*).

In Kazakhstan, there is also a growing understanding of the importance of developing media literacy. Efforts are underway to institutionalize the discipline within the education system, with teacher and trainer training programs being implemented. For instance, the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan included media literacy as an elective subject for eighth-grade students in the "Global Competencies" course starting in the 2021-2022 academic year. Educational resources on media literacy for university instructors have been developed, adapted to the local context, and provided in the state language.

The first media literacy textbook in Kazakhstan for high school students (grades 9–11/12), developed as part of an Internews project by the MediaNet International Journalism Center with the support of USAID, has been approved by the state expert commission and recommended for use in educational institutions. Additionally, two "media literacy hubs" have been established in the country, media literacy festivals are held, and the annual MediaCAMP Eduthon innovation training seminar takes place.

At the same time, discussions within the national context have shifted toward the government's restrictive policies in the information sphere. These policies, justified by existing challenges, aim to create a maximally "sterile" information environment and introduce censorship. Experts emphasize that Kazakhstan currently ranks 134th out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index, placing it in the category of countries where press freedom is deemed difficult.

Thus, they highlight the importance of framing recommendations related to disinformation from a perspective of human rights and freedom of expression. Efforts to combat propaganda should not equate to silencing media outlets that offer alternative viewpoints.

Indeed, governments often use the perceived danger of propaganda as a common argument to limit or ban inconvenient or hostile information, including foreign content. It also serves as a pretext for broader interference in media activities, such as licensing and cross-border broadcasting. (OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 2015).

At the same time, openly acknowledging the existing problem, rather than suppressing it, provides a foundation for advocating the broader implementation of media literacy education. As previously mentioned, such education is currently being introduced in secondary schools in Kazakhstan. However, it must be expanded to include the adult population of the country, offered in the Kazakh language in accessible formats, and take on a more widespread, mass character. This effort should be popularized with the involvement of opinion leaders and influencers. Moreover, this approach – openly recognizing the issue – can stimulate the activation of civil society in Kazakhstan. It can encourage society as a whole to participate in collective efforts to counter disinformation, strengthen societal responses, and develop skills for openly debunking false information.

Authors' contribution:

A.S. Beimisheva – development of concept, creation of the idea of publication; approval of the final version; formulation or development of key goals and objectives.

I.V. Mednikova – taking responsibility for all aspects of the work, the integrity of all parts of the article and its final version; preparation and editing of the text; drafting of the manuscript and its critical revision with the introduction of valuable

A.S. Zhussupova – development of methodology; development and design of methods, data collection, analysis, and interpretation of the obtained data

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Жалған ақпараттың қазіргі Қазақстан қоғамына әсер ету ерекшеліктері

Андатпа. Қазіргі әлемде ақпараттық ағындар барған сайын қарқын ала түсуде, ал жалған ақпараттың таралу мәселесі ерекше өзектілікке ие болуда. Фейк жаңалықтар, манипулятивті нарративтер мен үгіт-насихат қоғамдық пікірге әсіресе цифрлық орта жағдайында, айтарлықтай әсер етеді. Осындай жағдайда сыни ойлау мен медиасауаттылық әрбір азамат үшін маңызды дағдыларға айналады.

Бұл зерттеудің мақсаты – Қазақстан халқының медиасауаттылық деңгейін талдау, ақпаратты қабылдауға әсер ететін негізгі факторларды анықтау және жалған ақпаратқа ең осал топтарды айқындау. Жұмыста жалған мәліметтердің таралу механизмдері, олардың қоғамның әртүрлі топтарына әсері және оған қарсы іс-қимыл стратегиялары қарастырылады.

Зерттеу әдістемесі сандық және сапалық талдауды қамтиды: ел ауқымында 1000 респонденттен сауалнама жүргізілді, сондай-ақ медиа, коммуникация және білім беру саласындағы сарапшылармен сұхбаттар алынды. Нәтижелер көрсеткендей, халықтың едәуір бөлігі әртүрлі ақпарат көздерінен, оның ішінде әлеуметтік желілерден алынған мәліметтерге сыни тұрғыдан қарамайды. Әсіресе, жастар мен ауыл тұрғындары жалған ақпаратқа көбірек бейім келеді, өйткені олардың білім беру және аналитикалық ресурстарға қолжетімділігі шектеулі. Зерттеудің қорытындылары медиасауаттылықты дамытудың кешенді тәсілін енгізу қажеттілігін атап көрсетеді. Бұл тәсіл білім беру бастамаларын, ақпарат берудің ашықтығын арттыруды және ұлттық БАҚ-тың сапасын жақсартуды қамтуы тиіс. Зерттеудің практикалық маңыздылығы – азаматтардың ақпаратқа сыни көзқарасын қалыптастыруға, сенімді ақпарат көздеріне деген сенімді арттыруға және манипулятивті ақпараттық ықпалдарға қарсы тұра алатын тұрақты медиақұрылымды дамытуға бағытталған нақты шараларды әзірлеуде.

Түйін сөздер: медиасауаттылық, жалған ақпарат, сыни ойлау, фактчекинг, ақпараттық қауіпсіздік, әлеуметтік желілер, Қазақстан.

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Особенности воздействия дезинформации на современное казахстанское общество

Аннотация. В современном мире информационные потоки становятся все более интенсивными, а проблема распространения дезинформации приобретает особую актуальность. Фейковые новости, манипулятивные нарративы и пропаганда оказывают значительное влияние на общественное мнение, особенно в условиях цифровой среды. В таких условиях критическое мышление и медиаграмотность становятся важнейшими компетенциями для каждого гражданина.

Цель данного исследования – проанализировать уровень медиаграмотности населения Казахстана, выявить ключевые факторы, влияющие на восприятие информации, а также определить группы, наиболее подверженные дезинформации. В работе рассматриваются механизмы распространения недостоверных сведений, их влияние на различные слои общества и возможные стратегии противодействия.

Методология исследования включает количественный и качественный анализ: проведены опрос 1000 респондентов по всей стране и экспертные интервью со специалистами в области медиа, коммуникаций и образования. Результаты показывают, что значительная часть населения недостаточно критично относится к информации, поступающей из различных источников, включая социальные сети. Особенно уязвимыми перед дезинформацией оказываются молодёжь и жители сельской местности, имеющие ограниченный доступ к образовательным и аналитическим ресурсам.

Выводы исследования подчеркивают необходимость комплексного подхода к развитию медиаграмотности, который должен включать образовательные инициативы, усиление прозрачности в подаче информации и повышение качества работы национальных СМИ. Практическая значимость исследования заключается в разработке конкретных мер, направленных на формирование критического отношения граждан к информации, повышение уровня доверия к достоверным источникам и создание устойчивой медиасреды, способной противостоять манипулятивным информационным влияниям.

Ключевые слова: медиаграмотность, дезинформация, критическое мышление, фактчекинг, информационная безопасность, социальные сети, Казахстан.

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