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"TRADITIONAL VALUES" FOR THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VALUES, PRACTICES OF HELPING BEHAVIOR AND IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF TWO GENERATIONS OF RUSSIANS

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Abstract. In the context of the changing ideological orientations of Russian politics, its interpretation by modern Russians is of interest. We focus on two generations – one has already had the experience of living through fundamental transformations in the 1990s, the second is witnessing fundamental shifts for the first time. The article presents the results of an empirical study carried out in the logic of mixed methods research, aimed at understanding the intergenerational value transformations taking place within the age cohort of today's adult citizens of Russia. The survey results (N=600), which capture values, image of the future, and practices of prosocial (helping) behavior, are compared with the interview data (N=60), which reveal the meanings that representatives of two generations put into values and practices that are significant to them. Although there are some quantitative differences from the older generation in the value profile of young people, mainly due to age factors, representatives of the younger generation also demonstrate the specificity of the meanings attached to the interpretation of a number of values. While individualistic values are more important for the younger generation, their representatives demonstrate no less, and in some cases, greater, involvement in practices of helping behavior and volunteerism. It can be assumed that it is the transformation of meanings that allows the values of personal focus (individualistic) to motivate prosocial behavior. However, the revealed narrowness of the time perspective and the low level of social optimism act as a threat to the consolidation of prosocial patterns inherent in youth.

Keywords: values, generations, helping behavior, social optimism, particularism.

Introduction

The post-communist transition in Europe is one of the most significant and complex transformations of our time (*Van den Bosch, Fauve and De Cordier, 2021; Isaacs and Marat, 2021; Surzhko-Harned and Turkina, 2017*), which stimulated a wide range of national goal-setting strategies and corresponding trajectories of social integration and identity policies

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(Abashin, 2012; Perez-Solorzano, 1999; Miazhevich, 2012; Stepanenko and Sorokopud, 1999). The current "Russian project" is based on "traditional" values. They were approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 809 "On Approval of the Foundations of State Policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values" in November 2022. As the goals of this political program, the Decree noted the need to counter threats from "unfriendly foreign states, a number of multinational corporations and foreign non-profit organizations, as well as some organizations and individuals in Russia" (paragraph 2.13), leading to a situation of "value crisis, the loss of traditional spiritual and moral guidelines and moral principles by mankind" (paragraph 2.11). Such a political expression of will was a response to a long-running debate unfolding in the Russian media and academic fields with the active use of the rhetoric of moral decline: empirical studies claim a "lack of morality in society" (Mukhina, 2011) and a "negative state of morality in modern Russia" (Yurevich, 2018). The prioritization of the value of self-care and the spread of everyday practices aimed at increasing individual rather than collective well-being are represented as symptoms of a moral crisis.

The results of previous research demonstrate the heterogeneity of the value and identification dispositions of Russians. According to some authors, the split between Russian citizens who share different types of values and support different identity formation projects runs along generational boundaries (Radaev, 2020; Sokolov, 2019; Twenge, 2017). The unity of the social status of representatives of one generation is predetermined by the fact that they were born at about the same time and in the days of their youth (formative period) were influenced by the same historical events, which potentially contributes to the formation of the "entelechy of the generation" (Mannheim, 1978). The "entelechy of a generation" is understood as a special worldview, a system of interpretation of the surrounding world and motives for action in it, combined with the awareness of this ideological unity, i.e., the self-identification of individuals who make up a generation. In the conceptual system of the presented research, such systems of axiological interpretations and behavior are defined as values. Presenting values as the "core" of culture and taking as a framework the conceptual and methodological approach of S. Schwartz (Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995; Schwartz, 2012), we consider values as motivational principles of organizing individual perception, thinking, and activity.

Our focus is on two generations: the formative period of the first one coincided with the period of political transformations after the collapse of the Soviet Union (born in the 1970s), which influenced socio-political views and basic values, including attitudes towards power, the state and economic competition, freedom and responsibility, achievement, social and cultural diversity, etc. (Surzhko-Harned and Turkina, 2017). The second generation that we focus on is the generation of today's youth, the children of those who experienced the post-Soviet transition as adolescents. This generation of people, born in the 1990s, passed the initial stage of socialization in a relatively liberal atmosphere, but witnessed a neo-traditionalist turn in adolescence. It is the generation that determines the "tomorrow" of the country. Accordingly, understanding the values and goals of its representatives allows us to predict the development trajectories of Russian society (Radaev, 2020).

Method and data

In the framework of the empirical study of the values of Russians presented below, we raise the following questions:

a) What axiological shifts have occurred among modern Russian youth compared to the previous generation?

b) What kind of factors – age or generational – cause the differences in the interpretations of certain values by youth and older people?

c) How do the axiological shifts frame the prosocial (helping) behavior of representatives of both generations?

d) How do representatives of today's two "adult" generations of Russians see the future – personal and national?

The internal inconsistency and affective charge of values prompted us to apply a mixed convergent research design (Creswell, 2009). The results presented below are based on the use of a survey method combined with semi-structured interviews. The survey allowed us to compare the systems of value priorities of representatives of different generations, and the interview to explore often unconscious meanings. The questionnaire included blocks of questions about the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, their value orientations, time perspective, and practices of helping behavior. Similar blocks constituted the interview guide. Transcripts of interviews were coded using thematic analysis.

The sample includes Russian citizens belonging to two generational subgroups: the 1970s and the 1990s. 300 representatives of each generation took part in the survey, and 32 participated in the interviews. At both stages of the study, a quota sample was implemented with a 1:1 quota by generation, gender, and higher education. The survey is implemented in the CAWI format (self-completion of an online questionnaire by the respondent). The interviews were conducted in face-to-face and online video meetings, and the interview duration ranged from 48 to 96 minutes. The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented in Appendix 1.

Within the framework of the questionnaire, individual values were measured according to the methodology of S. Schwartz (Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz, 2008). The Schwartz's Portrait Values Questionnaire used in the study included 10 values measured by 21 statements describing a person. The respondents were asked to rate these descriptions on a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means the described person is "not like me at all", and 6 is "very much like me". All values, except for universalism, corresponded to two statements. Each value was calculated as the average of the responses according to the statements measuring it.

Involvement in the practice of helping behavior was measured by questions about the experience of providing non-material assistance over the past 12 months to others who are in different proximity to the respondent (from family members to strangers), motives for helping behavior (respondents rated the importance of each motive on a scale from 1 – "not important at all" to 5 – "very important"), and experience in volunteering. The respondents who answered that they have volunteering experience were asked an open-ended question about the type of volunteer work they were engaged in.

To measure time perspective, three questions were used. First, participants were asked about the period of time for which they can plan their future. The responses ranged from "no more than one month" to "more than ten years" on a 7-point scale. Second and third questions related to feelings that participant have about their personal future and the future of their country. These feelings were despair, fear, anxiety, calmness, hope for the better, and confidence in a good future. Each feeling was rated on a 5-point scale from 1 – "do not experience at all" to 4 – "experience all the time".

Results

We will present the results obtained in accordance with the logic of the research questions posed and consistently consider intergenerational similarities and differences in value profiles, taking into account their quantitative and qualitative manifestations revealed by the survey and during the interview. Then we will present data on the involvement of representatives of both generations in the practice of prosocial behavior, as well as a comparative assessment of the length of the time perspective and optimism about the future.

Individual values

For both the older generation and the youth, the leading values are security, independence, benevolence and universalism. At the same time, the generation of the 1990s also highly appreciates hedonism and achievement. The least important for representatives of both generations are power and stimulation. Comparing the values of representatives of two generations using a T-test for two independent samples demonstrated a higher importance of stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and benevolence for those born in the 1990s (Table 1).

Table 1. Comparison of the values of two generations

	Generation of the 1970s	Generation of the 1990s	
	Average value	Average value	
Conservation			
Security	4.76	4.62	-1.92
Conformity	3.98	3.9	-0.96
Tradition	3.96	3.86	-1.25
Openness to change			
Self-direction	4.43	4.52	1.1
Stimulation	3.12	3.73	7.16***
Hedonism	3.63	4.18	6.82***
Self-enhancement			
Achievement	3.42	4.03	6.64***
Power	2.69	3.32	7.04***
Self-transcendence			
Benevolence	4.19	4.44	3.17**
Universalism	4.29	4.38	1.25

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Thus, we see the predominance of values of individualistic focus in the value portrait of representatives of the younger generation. However, to reconstruct the meanings attached to them, we need to look at the interview results.

In the interview, among the individual values, the youth mention hedonism, self-realization, freedom, but also pays attention to aspects that determine the quality of social relations

and the psychological climate in the primary groups. Young people find security important, interpreted as an opportunity to build an extended time perspective. Representatives of the older generation, speaking of the "most important thing", name the same categories of values: health, family, self-realization, freedom, security, including financial, but in some cases, they attach to them substantially different interpretations (Appendix 2).

Thus, by "family", representatives of the older generation mean a group of people related by blood or legal relationship, and representatives of the younger generation – a circle of like-minded people, friends. This circle also includes a romantic partner and those of the blood relatives with whom the participant has a warm relationship. Representatives of both generations mention among the first the value of health. However, representatives of the older generation see health primarily in its somatic manifestations, while representatives of the youth see it in psychological ones. Representatives of both generations note among their value priorities the opportunity to contribute to the improvement of the social and natural environment, which we have defined as "generativity". For representatives of the older generation, the vector of realization of this value is mainly aimed at the next generation; in the interpretations of young people, its realization is synchronous.

Although there are a few areas of intergenerational differences in values, the representatives of the two generations themselves see them as very significant and sometimes insurmountable. Representatives of both generations attribute greater achievement and independence of thought and action to young people, while the parent generation is more focused on the quality of interpersonal relationships and caring for loved ones (*"Love is important for adults, but for the younger generation what comes first is money, career and competition" (f., 1990s, without higher education)*), conformism (*"The older generation values stability more, and it is more important for young people to think freely and not to adhere to stereotypes" (f., 1970s, with higher education).*) and conservatism (*"Naturally, young people are more liberal, the older generation tends more towards conservative authoritarianism" (m., 1990s, without higher education)*).

Time perspective

Almost 60% of Muscovites reported they cannot plan their future more than six months in advance, and 82% said they cannot make plans for more than a year in advance. Moreover, women are more likely than men to mention they are unsure of their plans more than a month in advance (Figure 1). No significant differences were observed between generations.




Figure 1. For what maximum period of time can you confidently plan your future? (% , single response)

When it comes to feelings about the personal future, the generation born in the 1990s generally perceives their future more emotionally. They report feelings of despair and fear, as well as tranquility, hope, and confidence in a good future, more often than the generation born in the 1970s. Men are more likely than women to report tranquility and less likely to report feelings associated with worries about the future and hope for the best. Respondents with higher education are significantly more likely to report anxiety when considering such thoughts. When assessing the country's future, the generation born in the 1970s is less likely than the generation born in the 1990s to report calm and confidence (Table 2).

Table 2. When you think about your personal future/about the future of the country, what feelings do you most often experience? (average value, score on a 5-point scale)

	Personal future			Future of the country		
	Total	Generation of the 1970s	Generation of the 1990s	Total	Generation of the 1970s	Generation of the 1990s
Despair	2	1.9	2.1	2	2	2.1
Fear	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3
Anxiety	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.5
Tranquility	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.7
Hope for the best	2.8	2.6	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.9
Confidence in a good future	2.6	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.7

In the narratives of representatives of both generations, we also find both optimistic assessments of the future and evidence full of dramatic experiences of the impossibility of seeing, imagining, and planning this future: *"First of all, I'm scared. And secondly, I think, what if everything changes? And, of course, there is a third option. What if I'm not going to live in this country?"* (f., 1990s, with higher education). The reduction of the time perspective occurs in the direction of both the future and the past, which is perceived by representatives of the older generation as a devaluation of the collective generational experience. Moreover, this devaluation is seen as the result of identity politics and social integration: *"The sequence of preserving history and some achievements has been interrupted, and you can see what a leap has been made in our country, from European values to some kind of "staples" now"* (f., 1970s, with higher education). The statements of representatives of the younger generation, which are symmetrical to this, indicate unwillingness to live in such a turbulent world, confusion and decreased self-efficacy: *"Due to the fact that society is being rebuilt, there are no prepared algorithms for life. And it seems that I only decided on an algorithm for life two or three years ago, as everything has changed"* (f., 1990s, with higher education).

The participants of the interview mentioned the following factors as conditions for a positive future: freedom (*"We do not have free media, we do not have the opportunity for people to gather freely for some of their interests, including those related to the state structure. We don't have the opportunity to unite. Thus, we lack freedom"* (f., 1970s, with higher education), social and cultural diversity (*"Radicalism will probably go away – the mood is that we will defeat everyone,*

we will destroy everyone, we are strong, cool. I hope that it is precisely European values that will be important" (m., 1990s, with higher education), inclusion ("I don't just want to call it patriotism, because it's probably not love for the Motherland anymore, it's probably more about people's love for each other. The main value for Russia in the future is that people should help others. And this already applies to the people, the family, and, in general, mutual understanding. That is, people should somehow try to understand each other" (f., 1970s, with higher education). It is noticeable that the universalist content of these values, which are the means of building a good future, fundamentally distinguishes them from "by definition" particularist "traditional" values.

Helping behavior

According to the survey results, half of the participants (51%) have provided non-financial assistance to family members or friends over the past year. One in four participants (25%) helped neighbors or colleagues for free, and one in five (21%) helped strangers. A third of the survey participants (32%) have not had to provide non-financial assistance to other people over the past year. Young people were less likely to support their neighbors immaterially, but more often representatives of the older generation helped colleagues and strangers (Table 3). On average, women engage in prosocial behavior more often than men (74% and 63% helped someone, respectively).

Table 3. Have you provided non-financial assistance (free of charge, in addition to professional duties) for other people in the last 12 months? (% , multiple response)

	Total	Generation of the 1970s	Generation of the 1990s
Family members	40	38	41
Friends	32	29	36
Neighbors	16	21	11
Colleagues	14	11	18
Strangers	21	17	25
Have not provided any help	32	36	27

According to the participants, the most important reasons for assisting are upbringing (4.1) and a sense of compassion (4), and the least is the desire to make a favorable impression on those who are being helped (2.3). At the same time, young people are more likely than representatives of the older generation to mention a sense of justice and social approval as the reasons for their charity (Table 4).

Table 4. There are many reasons why people choose to help others. Evaluate the importance of the following reasons for you personally (average value, score on a 5-point scale)

	Total	Generation of the 1970s	Generation of the 1990s
I help others because I like to feel needed	3.6	3.6	3.6

When I help others, I hope that someone will help me too	3.3	3.2	3.3
Helping others is a way to fight injustice	3.9	3.6	4.1
I help others because I feel compassion for them	4	4	4.1
I help others look better in their eyes	2.3	2.1	2.5
I help others because that's how I was raised	4.1	4.2	4.1

Over the past year, participants most often gave things to people they knew in need (32%) and also helped them financially (30%). Young people more often than representatives of the 1970s generation helped charitable organizations or NPOs as volunteers, participated in their work as official members, and also refused to consume goods or services (Table 5). The vast majority of participants (78%) have never volunteered, while only 22% have had such an experience. The most popular type of volunteering is helping homeless animals (14%), especially among women (20%). 9% of the participants have experience in event volunteering and support for the elderly. The main motive for participating in volunteer activities is compassion (37%). The top-3 drivers also included personal interest (8%) and love of helping as such (7%).

Table 5. Which of the above have you been doing over the past 12 months? (% , multiple response)

	Total	Generation of the 1970s	Generation of the 1990s
Gave away things (my own or specially purchased) to people in need, I knew	32	33	31
Gave money to people in need, I knew	30	29	32
Gave away things to specific people whom I do not know personally	23	22	25
Donated things to charities or non-profit organizations	21	19	23
Donated money to charities or non-profit organizations	20	19	20
Assisted animals in need or took individual actions to protect the environment	20	19	21
Give money to specific people whom I do not know personally	12	11	14
Signed petitions aimed at helping a person or organization	11	9	13
Helped charities or non-profit organizations as a volunteer	8	6	11
Worked for charities or non-profit organizations as an official member	5	2	8

Boycotted goods or services due to non-compliance with environmental or ethical standards	4	2	6
Participated in a demonstration aimed at helping a person or organization, organized by a non-profit organization, charitable organization or other public organization	3	2	4
Participated in a demonstration aimed at helping a person or organization, organized by an initiative group of citizens	2	1	3
Wore or displayed symbols of non-profit organizations	1	0.3	2
None of the above/difficult to answer	24	26	22

The practices of helping behavior identified during the interview do not have a pronounced generational specificity. In the narratives of representatives of both generations, examples of helping a narrow circle of loved ones (family, friends) are presented: *"Family is very important to me. If someone close to you needs something, of course, I'll drop everything and come running"* (f., 1990s, with higher education), *"Only family members will support and help"* (f., 1970s, with higher education), local communities (neighborhoods, parishes): *"Well, in small things, we put up a sandbox, filled in the hockey field, planted trees, and cleaned the yard"* (m., 1970s, without higher education), *"We help the homeless in our church, we collect food and clothes for them so that they can survive"* (f., 1990s, without higher education). In interviews with representatives of both generations, the practices of volunteer assistance and systemic activism are also presented: *"On Thursday we went to feed homeless people, and there a woman has been feeding people who need to eat for six years. Some other people who also want to participate bring her food"* (m., 1990s, without higher education), *"I devote most of my time and other resources to environmental protection, fire protection. I also like dogs, I try I treat stray dogs, find them homes, and participate in the search for Lisa Alert because I know the area and the forest well"* (m., 1970s, with higher education).

Thus, although young people prioritize the values of individual focus, they are involved in practices of helping behavior motivated by both the values of benevolence (helping loved ones is the motive of "compassion") and the values of universalism (helping strangers is the motive of "restoring justice"), no less or even more than representatives of the older generation. Although the value of tradition is not a priority for young people in itself, in the context of the motivation of helping behavior, it comes to the fore: the motivation of helping behavior is "I was raised that way," i.e., reflecting the cultural transmission, it turns out to be as significant as the two described above.

Discussion

An analysis of the values of youth and those born in the 1970s demonstrates a range of both directly coincident and differing values. Hedonism, freedom, self-realization, and hope as a reflection of existential security can be considered coincidental. The differences explicitly relate

only to the value of stability (the generation of the 1970s) and novelty (the generation of the 1990s), which is obviously due to age rather than generational differences, since, as has been demonstrated in previous studies, the preference for novelty and stimulation is a characteristic of young people in different cultures and universally decreases with age, and the value of stability, on the contrary, increases (*Tulviste, Kall and Rämmer, 2017*). Thus, while the older generation values stability, the youth prefer dynamism, but also recall stability, seeing it as a guarantee of the desired dynamics.

An interesting group consists of values that can be called homonymous: in the narratives of participants belonging to different generations, these values are represented by the same words, but their conceptual (substantial) content differs. It is here, as we believe, that meanings are discovered that can be attributed to generational specifications – that is, features formed as a result of cultural transformations that determine the essential differences between generations.

Thus, representatives of both generations name the value of health among their priorities. However, representatives of the older generation see health primarily in its somatic manifestations, while representatives of the youth see it in psychological ones. The emphasis on psychological well-being and health characteristics of young people, as we assume, is formed during socialization within the framework of the so-called "therapeutic" culture focused on self-improvement and self-care (*Lasch, 1979; Reiff, 1987*). The key trends of the "therapeutic culture" – the rise of the "psychological person" who guards his private life, has hedonistic and narcissistic attitudes (*Reiff, 1987*), the transformation of moral problems into analytical dilemmas that the individual solves in order to cope with fears and anxieties and self-realization – are to a certain extent appropriated by those participants in our research that represent the older generation (as evidenced by their inclusion of self-realization among their life priorities). However, for representatives of the youth sub-sample, these values and meanings determined by the "therapeutic culture" acquire a more holistic character, defining both instrumental and terminal values. Leading a healthy lifestyle means being in tune with your feelings, not just overcoming fears and anxieties, but forming a new understanding of well-being and happiness, and thereby maintaining the integrity and continuity of identity (*Roberto, Gigliotti and Husser, 2005*).

It is no coincidence, therefore, that the value of "family" in the narratives of representatives of different generations is also represented in different ways: for the older generation, the family is an intergenerational community based on blood ties, for the youth, it is people close in spirit. Apparently, this difference has a complex nature based on a combination of both age and generational aspects. Age is important because the young people we interviewed are at the stage of socialization when they have already been partially emancipated from their parental families (which fully corresponds to the psychological and social tasks of youth) and have not yet created their own. However, referring to the value of generativity revealed in the narratives of young participants, we can assume the generational specificity of the emerging interpretations of the value of the family.

Initially, according to E. Erickson, who proposed this term, generativity was considered as the conquest of the seventh of the eight stages of human life (*Erickson, 1968*), i.e., the age at which the representatives of the eldest of the age cohorts involved in the study are located. However, over time, the concept of generativity has evolved from understanding it as an interest in self-realization in the next generations (*Erickson, 1968*), through interpretation as a desire to delay one's symbolic departure (*Kotre, 1984*), to ideas about generativity as a phenomenon caused

by psychosocial factors, which is based on a focus on helping and caring for others and nature (McAdams and de St. Aubin, 1992). As a result of this evolutionary path, generativity has ceased to be associated with certain age stages. Regardless of age, generativity is realized in such activities as training, mentoring, volunteering and participation in public organizations (Azarow, 2003). Thus, generativity can be interpreted through a focus on contributing to the support of future generations (McAdams and de St. Aubin, 1992), which in our study is consistent with the value of hope, which is significant for representatives of both generations. The value of generativity is supported by studies of millennials' attitudes, according to which their value system includes concepts such as civic duty, morality, and social responsibility (Howe and Strauss, 2000), the behavioral embodiment of which we record in a variety of prosocial behavior practices.

However, the state of social optimism and the time perspective of Russians is alarming. Representative measurements of social optimism as confidence in positive changes in the country, recorded its growth throughout the 2000s and 2010s (VCIOM, 2020), and since the beginning of its development, according to experts, optimism, increasing at the level of decreasing happiness, acts as a "protective mechanism" for positive collective and personal identity (RBC, 2022). This essentially irrational defensive reaction is supported by official attempts to extend the time perspective into the past through the representation of "traditional values" as a semantic reference point for the "national project." Thus, the public representation of traditional values is associated with metaphorical images of the national code, the foundations of civilizational identity and spiritual bonds¹.

In accordance with the concept of basic values of S. Schwartz (1992, 2012) the neo-traditionalist turn can be considered as a result of the "value adaptation" of citizens of the post-Soviet space. The tendency found among citizens of Eastern European countries to attach greater importance to values such as conservatism and hierarchy was the result of adaptation to the requirements of the Soviet regime, i.e. demonstrating the adoption of policies and decisions concerning all aspects of life set by those who were in positions of power within the system, regardless of the population's real attitude to these decisions (Schwartz and Bardi 1997). This interpretation allows us to consider the actualization of traditional values and conservatism as, in general, a predictable adaptive reaction to the traumas and shocks of the post-Soviet period (Muravyova, 2014).

Sociological analysis, starting from E. Durkheim, connects traditional values with collective organization based on mechanical solidarity. In such a cultural context, integration is based on self-identification with the community, dominating and formatting, and in fact eclipsing all other identities. This kind of integration can be supported by various mechanisms of ideological propaganda, but they are always based on the reification of the group: community is represented as an objectively existing phenomenon of a primordial character. The community of "blood and soil" is maintained through the invention of tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), presented as an "appeal to the roots", a "revival" of values "intrinsically inherent" in the community (Gellner, 1983). This process of construction can originate within a community, but it is always beneficial to the elites (Anderson, 2006), and therefore, gaining institutional support forms a range of values and moral prescriptions.

¹"Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy" (2014); "National Security Strategy of Russia" (2015); "Strategy for the Development of Education in the Russian Federation through 2025" (2015); "Strategy for State Cultural Policy through 2030" (2016); "Strategy for the Development of the Information Society" (2017)

Conclusion

The results of the study revealed a significant similarity in the value portraits of representatives of two generations of Russians; however, they allowed us to identify quantitative (in terms of significance) and qualitative (in terms of content) differences. Some of the differences identified are due to age-related characteristics, such as risk-taking and hedonism, which are more attractive to young people. Some of the differences, as can be assumed based on social theory, are generational in nature and are caused by cultural transformations on a global scale. This applies to the values of family, health, and generativity. It can be assumed that it is the penetration of the value of generativity into younger age cohorts that fuels the diversity of practices of helping behavior implemented by young people to no less or even greater extent than representatives of the older generation. The time perspective, given its length and the predominance of positive feelings and expectations about the future (social optimism), could become a reliable basis for consolidating positive prosocial patterns (Nestik, 2021). However, the results obtained indicate a narrowed time perspective of Russians, which could potentially lead to an increase in the particularist potential of "traditional" values and the closure of practices of helping behavior in communities of the narrowest radius – the family.

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Authors' contribution

The first author formulated the main idea of the study, conducted a literature review, collected and analysis of qualitative data. The second author analyzed quantitative data. Both authors participated in quantitative data collection and overall development of the research design of the project. The authors agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work and for ensuring that any questions related to the accuracy of the data or the integrity of any part of the article are properly investigated and resolved.

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ҚАЗІРГІ ЖӘНЕ БОЛАШАҚҚА АРНАЛҒАН «ДӘСТҮРЛІ ҚҰНДЫЛЫҚТАР»: РЕСЕЙЛІКТЕРДІҢ ЕКІ ҰРПАҒЫНЫҢ ҚҰНДЫЛЫҚТАР, ПАЙДАЛЫ ҒАДЕТ ПРАКТИКАЛАРЫ ЖӘНЕ БОЛАШАҒЫ ТУРАЛЫ ИДЕЯЛАРЫНЫҢ САЛЫСТЫРМАЛЫ ЗЕРТТЕУІ

Аңдатпа. Ресей саясатының идеологиялық бағыттары өзгерген сайын, 1990 жылдары ұқсас өзгерістерді бастан кешірген және алғаш рет түбегейлі өзгерістерді көрген қазіргі орыстардың бұл өзгерістерді қалай түсінетінін түсіну қызықты. Бұл мақалада бүгінгі ересек Ресей азаматтарының когортасында болып жатқан ұрпақаралық құндылық өзгерістерін түсінуге бағытталған сапалық және сандық деректерді жинау және талдау әдістерін қолдана

отырып жүргізілген эмпириялық зерттеудің нәтижелері ұсынылған. Шварцтың әдіснамалық негізіне және болашақ туралы түсініктеріне сәйкес құндылықтарды, сондай-ақ екі ұрпаққа тән проәлеуметтік (көмекші) мінез-құлық тәжірибелерін қамтитын сауалнама нәтижелері (N=600) Сұқбат деректерімен (N=60) салыстырылып, екі ұрпақ өкілдерінің өздерінің маңызды құндылықтары мен тәжірибелеріне қандай мағына беретінін көрсетеді. Жастардың құндылық профилінде, ең алдымен, жас факторларына байланысты, егде жастағы адамдармен салыстырғанда кейбір сандық айырмашылықтар болғанымен, жас буын өкілдері белгілі бір құндылықтарды түсіндіруге байланысты нақты мағыналарды да көрсетеді. Жеке құндылықтар жас ұрпақ үшін маңыздырақ болғанымен, олар көмекші мінез-құлық пен еріктілікке аз емес, ал кейбір жағдайларда көбірек қатысатынын көрсетеді. Мағынаның бұл түрленуі жеке бағдарланған (индивидуалистік) құндылықтардың проәлеуметтік мінез-құлықты ынталандыруына мүмкіндік береді деп болжауға болады. Дегенмен, анықталған тар уақыт перспективасы және әлеуметтік оптимизмнің төмен деңгейі жастарға тән проәлеуметтік үлгілердің нығаюына қауіп төндіреді.

Негізгі ұғымдар: құндылықтар, ұрпақтар, көмекші мінез-құлық, әлеуметтік оптимизм, парцикулизм.

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«ТРАДИЦИОННЫЕ ЦЕННОСТИ» ДЛЯ НАСТОЯЩЕГО И БУДУЩЕГО: СРАВНИТЕЛЬНОЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ ЦЕННОСТЕЙ, ПРАКТИК ПОМОГАЮЩЕГО ПОВЕДЕНИЯ И ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЙ О БУДУЩЕМ ДВУХ ПОКОЛЕНИЙ РОССИЯН

Аннотация. В условиях смены идеологических ориентиров российской политики интерес представляет ее осмысление современными россиянами как имевшими опыт переживания подобных трансформаций в 1990-е, так и наблюдающими коренные сдвиги впервые. Статья представляет результаты эмпирического исследования, выполненного в логике смешивания качественных и количественных методов сбора и анализа данных, нацеленного на понимание межпоколенческих ценностных трансформаций, происходящих внутри возрастной когорты сегодняшних взрослых граждан России. Результаты опроса (N=600), фиксирующие ценности в соответствии с методологическим аппаратом Ш. Шварца и представления о будущем, а также присущие представителям обоих поколений практики просоциального (помогающего) поведения, сопоставляются с данными интервью (N=60), позволяющими раскрыть те смыслы, которые вкладывают представители двух поколений в значимые для них ценности и практики. При некоторых количественных отличиях от старшего поколения в ценностном профиле молодежи, обусловленных, преимущественно, возрастными факторами, представители более молодого поколения демонстрируют и специфичность смыслов, вкладываемых в трактовку ряда ценностей. При большей значимости для молодого поколения индивидуалистических ценностей его представители демонстрируют не меньшую, а в ряде случаев – большую вовлеченность в практики помогающего поведения и волонтерство. Можно предположить, что именно произошедшая трансформация смыслов позволяет ценностям личностного фокуса (индивидуалистическим) мотивировать просоциальное поведение. Однако выявленная узость временной перспективы и низкий уровень социального оптимизма выступают в качестве угрозы для закрепления присущих молодежи просоциальных паттернов.

Ключевые слова: ценности, поколения, помогающее поведение, социальный оптимизм, партикуляризм.

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Appendix 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents

	Generation of the 1970s	Generation of the 1990s
Gender, %		
Female	51	49
Male	49	51
Age, average value	50,16	24,23
Education level, %		
No higher education	50	50
Higher education	50	50
Occupation, %		
I work	76	60
I study and work	0	17
I study	0	13
I'm not working	24	10
Type of employment, %		

Head of a large or medium-sized company (more than 50 employees)	1	5
Head of a small company (50 employees or less)	1	3
A mid-level manager (division, department, group)	17	12
A specialist with higher education (line employee)	27	27
An office worker, a trade worker, or a service worker without higher education	16	20
Technical or maintenance personnel	9	8
Skilled worker, foreman	12	8
A soldier, a policeman, an employee of the Russian Guard, of the Federal Penitentiary Service	2	2
Individual employment with the involvement of employees for hire	2	3
Individual employment without involving employees or self-employment	13	12
Financial situation, %		
Below average	37	29
Average	49	40
Above average	14	31
Ethnicity (open question), %		
Russian	89	72
A Russian citizen	3	7
Other	4	8
Refusal to respond	1	6
I find it difficult to answer	3	7
Religiosity, %		
I consider myself a follower of religion	45	37
I don't consider myself a follower of religion	47	51
Refusal to respond	1	3
I find it difficult to answer	7	9
The denomination (an open question), %		
Orthodoxy	55	41
Christianity	37	35
Islam	2	12
Other	4	7
I find it difficult to answer	2	5

Appendix 2. Values in the narratives of representatives of two generations

Generation of the 1970s	Generation of the 1990s
Family: <i>"As life shows, no one needs us except the family. That is, the relationship between parents, children, the older generation and the younger generation is the most valuable thing. Because moral principles and mentality are transmitted"</i> (f., with higher education)	The quality of social relationships and the psychological climate in the primary groups: <i>"I began to value time with my family and relationships with them more. When I have no one to share my thoughts with, it makes me very... sad, and I get depressed, so communicating with friends is also important to me"</i> (m., with higher education)
Health: <i>"When you encounter some difficult illnesses, and when at some point your arms and legs are taken away, everything hurts, and you don't understand whether tomorrow will be of high quality or not – naturally, all values are shaken up very much. And in fact, of course, when you wake up and you don't have any pain, it's already happiness"</i> (f., without higher education)	Health: <i>"Psychological health, financial freedom, the health of my loved ones and mine"</i> (m., without higher education), <i>"the mental state of my own and my environment"</i> (m., with higher education)
Generativity: <i>"Family, a significant contribution to the development of humanity and the preservation of the planet, nature. Everything is somehow interconnected here, it is the continuation of my kind both in the literal sense, as my family, so everything is for the family, and in a broader sense, that is, the human race. The family gives everything, the family gives meaning, the family gave me life, the family must continue, so this is a generational bond"</i> (m., with higher education)	Generativity: <i>"It's important to me that the people around me are happy too. And it is important that everything is fine with nature. I think that everyone will definitely understand that there is happiness for them, which gives them positive emotions and develops their values inside. That is, it is also important to me that other people are doing well too, and then it will be more peaceful for me to live in such a society"</i> (f., with higher education)
Hedonism: <i>"First of all, financial stability. This point implies a lot of things that are also very important to me: travel, things, delicious food and the opportunity to help those who are not as lucky as me. It's important that I feel confident"</i> (f., with higher education)	Hedonism: <i>"It is important for me to enjoy life, so that I can be very comfortable and pleasant to live every day"</i> (f., without higher education)
Self-realization: <i>"I set my own goals, set my own priorities, and allocate the amount of time I spend on them. And I really don't want to lose it, including for the sake of money"</i> (m., with higher education)	Self-realization: <i>"To listen to myself, to my desires, to try to build my own path, and not to focus on someone else's values"</i> (f., without higher education)
Freedom: <i>"Complete freedom and the absence of outside pressure. And Russian society is... sheep-like"</i> (f., without higher education)	Freedom: <i>"Freedom of movement, freedom of choice, freedom of expression. Freedom... I believe that everything else comes from this"</i> (m., without higher education)

<p>Stability: <i>"Stability is the financial condition, the availability of permanent work, and with various economic shocks in the country, the financial situation must be maintained"</i> (f., with higher education)</p>	<p>Stimulation/novelty: <i>"To make life not boring, intense, travel somehow, get some new experiences, try something new, new hobbies, entertainment"</i> (m., with higher education)</p>
<p>Hope: <i>"It is very difficult for a person to live without hope, he tries to make planning horizons, and when nothing good happens, this is the condition of a seriously ill person"</i> (m., with higher education)</p>	<p>Hope: <i>"I would like to have a planning horizon for at least two weeks"</i> (m., with higher education)</p>